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I.THE CONGRESSMAN’S “CASH IN” UTTERANCE UPON
DEPARTING THE WHITE HOUSE ON FEBRUARY 5, 1937
Frustrated and angered by the Supreme Court’s invalidation
of a dozen New Deal laws and programs as unconstitutional during
the preceding two years, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) on
February 5, 1937, summoned to the White House key leaders of
Congress, including the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee,
Representative Hatton W. Sumners of Dallas. The President
announced a surprising legislative proposal — quickly tagged the
“court-packing plan”1 — to create on that bench a comfortable
* Visiting Scholar, Department of History, The University of Texas at
Austin; Retired Partner in Residence, Vinson & Elkins, LLP, Dallas, Texas
office. The author is writing the biography of Congressman Sumners, and he
thanks Jacqueline Jones, Stephen L. Wasby, Judge Glock, Ira Katznelson,
Nancy Beck Young, Mary Catherine Monroe, Anthony Champagne, Gregg
Cantrell, and Michael R. Hayslip. An early version of this article was presented
to the Dallas Area Society of Historians on October 30, 2020, and the author is
grateful to its members for helpful comments. Thanks also to Kaitlyn Price and
Chris. Bohannan, archivists of the Dallas Historical Society. The author is
solely responsible for the article’s content, and any statements about the law do
not necessarily reflect the views of the law firm from which he is retired or its
clients. © 2021 by Josiah M. Daniel, III
1. “Court-packing” was not a new term. See Edward B. Whitney, Insular
Decisions of December 1901, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 79, 80 (1902) (“charges of courtpacking [would] unsettle confidence in our form of government”). The term
carries a whiff of opprobrium. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN
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majority of votes inclined to sustain the New Deal’s laws and
programs against ongoing constitutionality and related court
challenges by businesses and individuals in cases filed in the federal
courts. FDR took no questions and adjourned the meeting.2
Later in the year, after Roosevelt had lost his gambit,
journalists Joseph Alsop and Turner Catledge published in the
September 18th Saturday Evening Post an article titled “The 168
Days: The Story Behind the Story of the Supreme Court Fight,” in
which, under a subheading of “No. 1 Opposition Man,” they reported
that, immediately after the announcement, Vice President John
Nance Garner, House Majority Leader Sam Rayburn, and Sumners
returned in a taxi to the Capitol together:
After they had left the White House, after they had turned down past
the Treasury, Hatton Sumners spoke to the men with him.
“Boys,” he said, “here’s where I cash in my chips.”
It was the first announcement of opposition to the plan . . . .3

The journalists slightly misquoted Sumners’s pithy remark,
and historians and legal scholars have almost uniformly
perpetuated the mistake, countless times, to the present day.4 They
have, moreover, misunderstood it.
Thomas B. Love was a Texas Democratic politician who ran the
next year against Sumners.5 After reading that magazine article, he
wrote Sumners on October 6th asking whether, back on February
5th, Sumners had uttered the eight words as Alsop and Catledge
reported, “Boys, here’s where I cash in my chips,” and demanding
LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 159 (2008) (“the infamous court packing plan . . .
unleashed in 1937”). The legal definition is FDR’s “unsuccessful proposal . . . to
increase the number of U.S. Supreme Court justices from nine to fifteen.”
Black’s Law Dictionary, court packing plan, at 456 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 11th
ed. 2019).
2. JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME
COURT 293 (2010) [hereinafter, SHESOL, SUPREME POWER] (“Roosevelt promptly
excused himself”).
3. Joseph Alsop & Turner Catledge, The 168 Days: The Story Behind the
Story of the Supreme Court Fight [Part 1], SATURDAY EVENING POST, Sept. 18,
1937, at 8, 94 (emphasis added). Two more excerpts of the forthcoming book
appeared in the magazine in the following weeks and the book was published
the next year. JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS 67-68 (1938)
[hereinafter ALSOP & CATLEDGE, 168 DAYS].
4. This eight-word version “‘Boys, here's where I cash in my chips,’ appears
in almost every account of the Court fight,” G.M. Gressley, Joseph C.
O'Mahoney, FDR, and the Supreme Court, 40 PAC. HIST. REV. 183, 190 (1971),
and has become “part of congressional lore.” Mary Catherine Moore, Sumners,
Hatton
William
(1875-1962),
TEXAS
STATE
HISTORICAL
ASS’N,
www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/fsu04
[perma.cc/J2C8-PFBV].
See, e.g., PAUL D. MORENO, THE AMERICAN STATE FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO THE
NEW DEAL: THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE TRIUMPH OF
PROGRESSIVISM 278, 303 (2013); KERMIT L. HALL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: SEPARATION OF POWERS AND COURT-PACKING 353 (2000).
5. Seeks Seat in Congress, DALL. MORNING NEWS, June 19, 1938, at 1.
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“what was the meaning of this statement?”6 On October 23rd,
Sumners responded:
You inquire whether . . . I said “Boys, here’s where I cash in my chips.”
What I said was “Here’s where I cash in.” You ask for an explanation,
and briefly this is it . . . [M]y reaction was that the President must have
been imposed on. I determined to go in and to do what I could to help
straighten things out and not to count the cost to myself . . . as I saw the
situation somebody had to go in and try to be helpful about it. As I further
saw it, the person who did go in would probably not come out politically
alive. I said “cash in” and I meant “cash in” as we know that expression
in the Southwest . . . I do not have the slightest doubt that when we get
a bit less controversial that it will be generally agreed that I have been
able in this matter to render a service of value to the President, the party
and the country, especially when considered in connection with the other
legislation which I sponsored.7

By reprising his February 5th remark as six words, rather than
eight — that is, “Here is where I cash in,” leaving off “my chips” and
then repeating the catchphrase “cash in” twice more in the letter —
the Congressman emphasized that his February 5th statement had
not contained the words “my chips.”
More importantly, in this generally overlooked apologia,
written soon after the crisis had ended, Sumners explained that “the
meaning” of “cash in” was contrary to what Love obviously
supposed. Accurately, if obliquely, Sumners’s letter explained both
for his opponent and for posterity the role he had played not simply
in the defeat of the plan but more significantly in the solution of the
litigation problem — the unconstitutionality rulings and two
thousand injunctions against federal officials’ implementation of
New Deal programs — that had motivated the President to make
his drastic proposal in the first place. Although largely
unrecognized, Sumners played, this article argues, an instrumental
role, and he deserves credit for the “legislation [he] sponsored,” two
additions to the Judicial Code that solved the problem and also
constituted permanent contributions to the federal judicial system.
The frame of reference is that of legal history, employing lenses

6. Thomas B. Love to Hatton W. Sumners, Oct. 6, 1937, Sumners Papers. In
these footnotes, Sumners’s documents and correspondence, which reside in the
collection named “Hatton W. Sumners Papers” in the archive of the Dallas
Historical Society at its headquarters, the Hall of State, in Dallas, Texas, is
called the “Sumners Papers,” and Sumners is referred to as “HWS.”
Correspondence to and from HWS in that archive is therefore cited as: “[name]
to HWS, [or vice versa], [date], Sumners Papers.” The author personally
reviewed and copied all of those documents of the Sumners Papers that are cited
in this article. Copies of all archival documents cited in these footnotes from the
Sumners Papers and from other archives are in the possession of the author and
of the UIC John Marshall Law Review.
7. HWS to Thomas B. Love, Oct. 25, 1937, Sumners Papers [hereinafter
HWS to Love] (emphasis added).
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of legal biography, legislative history, and political history qua legal
history to refract and understand Sumners’s written and spoken
words and his actions as a legislator throughout the FebruaryAugust 1937 period of the court-packing crisis.8 With those tools, I
determine his role and assess the results of his work including
specific changes in the law and its functioning in the matters of a
president’s appointment of justices to the Supreme Court as one
means of influencing its jurisprudence9 and also of the pre-Supreme
Court phases of the process of adjudicating constitutionality issues.
Then the article assesses this lawyer-legislator’s place in the 1937
crisis and his significance for the present.
First, as three legal historians recently observed, legal
biography is “scholarship fit for the twenty-first century”10 because
a “natural nosiness” about others’ lives attracts readers to legal, as
it does to other types of, biography.11 Then “legal biography creates
an access point for scholars in other disciplines and for ordinary
people into the life and development of the law.”12 As legal historian
David Sugarman puts it, “legal life writing, broadly conceived, offers
new ways of advancing legal history and socio-legal scholarship, and
of encouraging inter-disciplinary dialogue between them, and also
with other fields and audiences.”13 Second, legislative history, the
down-in-the-weeds tracing of bill filings, committee proceedings and
reports, and statements and votes by the members of Congress, a
tradecraft taught in law schools’ legal-research courses but
generally considered unimportant today with “textualism” regnant
in courts’ interpretative endeavors, is quite helpful here.14 It
8. Both contemporary commentators and scholars uniformly speak of the
February through July or August period of controversy as a “crisis,” justifiably
based on its definition. See HARRY RITTER, DICTIONARY OF CONCEPTS IN
HISTORY, crisis, at 79 (1986) (“A short period of decisive challenge, a turning
point that determines the survival of a person, institution, or condition, or its
disappearance”).
9. Other methods include, of course, the appointment and confirmation
process for federal judges, stripping or revising the legislative grants of
jurisdiction, and impeachment of judges. See Terence J. Lau, Judicial
Independence: A Call for Reform, 9 NEV. L. J. 79 (2008).
10. Victoria Barnes, Catharine MacMillan & Stefan Vogenauer, On Legal
Biography, 41 J. Legal Hist. 115, 116 (2020) [hereinafter Barnes et al, Legal
Biography].
11. Laura Kalman, The Power of Biography, 23 L. & Soc. Inquiry 479, 482
(1998); Paul Murray Kendall, The Art of Biography 4 (1965) (“The biographer
explores the cosmos of a single being. History deals in generalizations about a
time . . .”).
12. Barnes et al, Legal Biography, supra note 9, at 116.
13. David Sugarman, From Legal Biography to Legal Life Writing:
Broadening Conceptions of Legal History and Socio-legal Scholarship, 42 J. L.
& SOC’Y 7, 11 (2015).
14. “The term ‘legislative history’ typically refers to a fixed universe of
statements and documents generated during the legislative process in
Congress, consisting of committee reports and of statements made in hearings,
committee markups, and on the floor of each chamber.” Jesse M. Cross,
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establishes an authoritative timeline and important details of
agency in a story that hinges on revision of positive law in order to
solve the New Deal’s litigation problem and to assuage the public’s
consternation over the President’s attempt to forge his own solution
to that problem. Third, within the many “law & ____” dyads of legalhistorical analysis that Catherine Fisk has well described,15 the
concept of “law & political history” is useful because it “locat[es]
change in the functioning of law” including “change[s] in [certain]
mechanisms . . . through which governance means are given
effect.”16
Because scholars have overlooked Sumners, it is generally not
known that the relatively modest, low-profile Congressman viewed
himself as the right man to, indeed, the only political actor who
could, rescue both the Court and the President from the courtpacking crisis — and that he did so by means of two targeted bills
he had already filed. One called the Retirement Act quickly induced
the vacating of the first seat on the Court, that of a sturdy opponent
of the New Deal, Justice Willis Van Devanter.17 That act, which has
received scholarly focus only quite recently in an article by historian
Judge Glock, assured the vindication of the New Deal by quickly
procuring one, and soon more, vacancies on the bench for the
President to fill.18 Sumners’s second bill, sometimes called the
Legislative History in the Modern Congress, 57 HARV. J. LEGIS. 91, 94 n.8 (2020),
citing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 981-1021 (4th ed. 2007). A traditional
appreciation of the value of legislative history states:
an historian . . . would never . . . suggest that one could understand a
major piece of legislation merely by reading its provisions. One needs
legislative history, a knowledge of the political pressures at work on the
bill, the effect that public opinion had in moving the process forward,
what pressure groups supported and opposed the bill, and a myriad of
other considerations.
Melvin I. Urofsky, Beyond the Bottom Line: The Value of Judicial Biography,
1998 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 143, 148 (1998). But “[c]ourts now generally appear less
willing to credit legislative history, whatever the source.” John M. De
Figueiredo & Edward H. Stiglitz, Signing Statements and Presidentializing
Legislative History, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 841, 866 (2017). See also James J.
Brundey & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History?, 89
JUDICATURE 220 (2005-2006). On today’s textualism, see generally, ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS (2012).
15. Catherine L. Fisk, &: Law __ Society in Historical Legal Research, in
MARKUS D. DUBBER & CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
LEGAL HISTORY 479 et seq. (2018) [hereinafter DUBBER & TOMLINS].
16. Roy Kreitner, Legal History as Political History, in DUBBER & TOMLINS,
supra note 15 at 139.
17. Mark Tushnet, Willis Van Devanter: The Person, 45 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 308
(2020).
18. Judge Glock, Unpacking the Supreme Court: Judicial Retirement,
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Intervention Bill, which has been almost totally ignored, served to
help prevent any further invalidations of New Deal laws and
programs in a different way. It protected against or limited any
unconstitutionality holdings for the legislative programs
propounded by and enacted for Roosevelt, and for any later
president, by involving the Justice Department at the earliest
possible stage in federal-court cases between private litigants that
generate such issues and also by raising the hurdle for litigants to
obtain injunctions against federal officials’ enforcement of a
challenged law.
Sumners’s role in the resolution of the crisis deserves
consideration and appreciation after eight decades of neglect. His
relatively simple legislative accomplishments bookend the period,
the Retirement Act residing at the front end and the Intervention
Act emplaced at the tail of the controversy, and have importance
for more than just reinforcing the consensus of historians that FDR
made a significant mistake in seeking to pack the Supreme Court.19
Rather, the two acts evidence Sumners’s distinctive and causal
agency, foresightedly utilizing the legislative process to resolve the
court-packing crisis of the Roosevelt presidency; moreover, his two
enactments have served as permanent improvements to the judicial
functioning of the federal government to the present day.20

II.HATTON W. SUMNERS’S LIFE AND CONGRESSIONAL
CAREER
Although lacking a full biography and not well known today,
Hatton W. Sumners (1875-1962) was a Congressman of national
consequence during a legislative career spanning four of the first
five decades of the 20th century.21 He was a complex figure. Born
Judicial Independence, and the Road to the 1937 Court Battle, 106 J. AMER.
HIST. 47 (2019) [hereinafter Glock, Unpacking].
19. A representative assessment: “In failing to get [the plan] through
Congress, [FDR] cost himself the invincibility that had seemed to surround him
since March 1933 and that the election of 1936 had only intensified . . . the court
scheme . . . ruined his chances of expanding the New Deal.” H.W. BRANDS,
TRAITOR TO HIS CLASS: THE PRIVILEGED LIFE AND RADICAL PRESIDENCY OF
FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT at 474-75 (2008) [hereinafter BRANDS, TRAITOR
TO HIS CLASS].
20. See Arthur S. Miller & Jeffrey H. Bowman, Presidential Attacks on the
Constitutionality of Federal Statutes: A New Separation of Powers Problem, 40
OHIO ST. L.J. 51, 57 (1979) (“Can there be any doubt that Congress, by enacting
H.R. 2260, intended to provide a means whereby the public's (the government's)
interest could be defended in private litigation? The answer is clear beyond
peradventure . . . . No longer must the Government stand idly by, a helpless
spectator, while the Acts of Congress are stricken down by the Courts.”).
21. See Mary Catherine Monroe, A Day in July—Hatton W. Sumners and
the Court Reorganization Plan of 1937 (M.A. thesis, Univ. of Texas at Arlington,
1973) [hereinafter Monroe, A Day in July]. A good but very short account is JAN
ONOFRIO, Hatton W. Sumners, TENNESSEE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 294
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near Fayetteville, Lincoln County, Tennessee, he was the middle of
three children of William A. and Anna Walker Sumners.22 His older
brother Tully became a physician and his younger sister Kate a
homemaker and Hatton’s lifelong confidante.23 Their father had
served as an officer in the Confederate Army, and by the 1880s his
parents owned and operated a coeducational school in rural
Tennessee.24 The family moved to Garland, Texas in 1893.25
Sumners’s pre-legal education included door-to-door book sales
as a teenager in Tennessee before the move; a final year of schooling
at Garland College, a private institution that served as the town’s
high school, in which he excelled in oratory26; and, last, a job in a
relative’s dry goods and grocery store in Garland.27 Then he moved
the short distance to Dallas and read law from 1895 to 1896 in the
office of Alfred P. Wozencraft, a prominent lawyer who served as the
City Attorney.28 Sumners’s notebook of his law-office apprenticeship
is filled with references to natural law, the common law, and, at the
very end, the U.S. Constitution.29
In 1897, he gained admission to the Texas bar and quickly
organized a Democratic Party club for young businessmen and
(2000) [hereinafter Onofrio, Sumners]. Sumners devised his estate to the
Hatton W. Sumners Foundation which provides scholarships and sponsors lawrelated education. On its website is a useful, but episodic and not impartial
biographical sketch by Whitehurst. See Elmore Whitehurst. Hatton W.
Sumners: His Life and Public Service: An Extended Biographical Sketch 7 (n.d.),
www.hattonsumners.org/library/public_service.pdf
[perma.cc/8W3H-XULG]
[hereinafter Whitehurst, Sumners]; see also Elmore Whitehurst, A Texas
Portrait: Hatton W. Sumners, 39 TEX. B.J. 331 (1976). A partial political
biography of Sumners, ending ten years before he left Congress, is a
dissertation. RON C. LOVE, CONGRESSMAN HATTON W. SUMNERS OF DALLAS,
TEXAS: HIS LIFE AND CONGRESSIONAL CAREER, 1875-1937 (Tex. Christian Univ.
dissertation 1990).
22. Whitehurst, Sumners, supra note 21, at 1; Father of Former Teacher
Died, Sumners Papers (undated obituary of Dr. Tully Sumners, brother of
HWS); HWS to Kate Sumners Davis, and Mrs. Davis to HWS, multiple letters
over decades, Sumners Papers (Mrs. Davis had no children; she and HWS
corresponded frequently on family, personal, and political matters).
23. Id.
24. Male and Female Academy, Boons Hill, Lincoln County, Tenn., July 17,
1876, copy in the file of the author (school brochure showing “W.A. Sumners,
Principal” and “Mrs. A.E. Sumners, Preceptress”).
25. Whitehurst, Sumners, supra note 21, at 1.
26. Whitehurst, Sumners, supra note 21 at 2.
27. Id.
28. Id.; DARWIN PAYNE, AS OLD AS DALLAS ITSELF: A HISTORY OF THE
LAWYERS OF DALLAS, THE DALLAS BAR ASSOCIATIONS, AND THE CITY THEY
HELPED BUILD (1999), at 91-92.
29. Sumners’s notebook ends with his remarks about the U.S. Constitution
including “Equal rights for all” but also urging himself to “memorize” its specific
limitations on states’ power set forth in Article I, § 10. HWS, Study of the Law,
Sumners Papers.
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professionals.30 In 1900, voters elected him Dallas County Attorney,
ousted him two years later in an election he contested as fraudulent,
and then reelected him for one more two-year term.31 He prosecuted
saloons and gambling activities in Dallas, earning admiration from
the progressive and prohibitionist Democrats in the city.32 Then
followed a period of private practice during which he served highprofile causes and individuals such as the students’ association of
what is now Texas A&M University in obtaining the dismissal of
the institution’s president,33 Texas cotton growers in disputing
freight rates before the Texas Railroad Commission,34 and the
famous cattleman Charles Goodnight who needed a financial
restructuring. Additionally, he wrote essays as a correspondent for
Farm and Home magazine, whose Dallas-based publisher, Frank
Holland, sent him on a tour of Europe in 1907 to learn about
agricultural-cooperative marketing.35
With mentoring and support from Holland, Sumners ran in
1912 as a Democratic Party candidate and won one of Texas’ two atlarge seats in the U.S. House of Representatives.36 Two years later,
the voters elected him in Dallas’ Fifth Congressional District, the
seat he held until retirement in 1947.37 Within three terms,
Sumners gained membership on the House’s Judiciary
Committee.38 While he enacted little legislation, indeed introducing
few substantive bills before the New Deal,39 he secured a modicum
of federal benefits and projects for Dallas such as in his first term
securing its designation as a port of entry and later a new federal
penitentiary in a Dallas suburb.40
During the years preceding the Great Depression he read
works of and about law at the Library of Congress and steadily built

30. Whitehurst, Sumners, supra note 21, at 2.
31. Id. at 2-3; WRIT IS DISSOLVED, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Mar. 31, 1902, at
12; Mr. Sumners Files Bond, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Nov. 20, 1904, at 27.
32. Whitehurst, Sumners, supra note 21, at 2-3.
33. PAUL D. CASEY, THE HISTORY OF THE A. & M. COLLEGE TROUBLE 1908
at 101 passim (containing a verbatim transcript of Sumners’s examination of
witnesses in the hearing before the college’s board of directors).
34. Sumners’s Employer in the Cotton Rates Reduction Case, HOUS. POST,
FEB. 3, 1910, at 4.
35. HWS, untitled journal of his European tour, Sumners Papers.
36. HWS, Hatton W. Sumners: Candidate for Congressman at Large (Subject
to Democratic Primary), campaign poster, Sumners Papers; Whitehurst,
Sumners, supra note 21, at 3.
37. Whitehurst, Sumners, supra note 21, at 4.
38. Id.
39. A statute he sponsored in 1928 still useful today — as demonstrated in
the January 6, 2021 congressional proceeding to confirm the 2020 presidential
electors’ vote — is his amendment of the Electoral Count Act to simplify the
procedures by which the states submit their presidential electors’ votes to the
President of the Senate for counting. H.R. 7373, 70th Cong., 45 Stat. 945, Pub.
L. No. 569 (codified at 3 U.S.C. § 7a (1926, Supp. II, 1928)).
40. Whitehurst, Sumners, supra note 21, at 4.
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a reputation as a lawyer-legislator.41 By 1924, he ascended to the
position of ranking minority member of the House’s Committee on
the Judiciary and served as its chair from 1931 until his 1947
retirement to Dallas.42 He impressed the Supreme Court’s justices
with his legislative work on the “Judges’ Bill” that became the
Judiciary Act of 1925. During the years preceding and during the
Great Depression, he experienced frustration but gained notice for
handling the Senate trials of three impeached federal district
judges.43 He appeared as amicus curiae on behalf of the House in
the Supreme Court on four occasions.44 In the Twenties, Chief
Justice William Howard Taft called him “the best lawyer in
Congress” and dropped in on him at his Capitol Hill office,
unannounced, from time to time.45
In 1934, at the urging of Roosevelt, Sumners accepted the
invitation of the Philippine Islands’ territorial government to assist
in the preparation of a constitution to become effective upon
independence under the Tydings Act.46 He modeled his draft on the
U.S. Constitution, tracking the language of its provisions but
rearranging their order.47 Reflecting his frustration with the
American impeachment process, one of his innovations provided
that Philippine federal judges would serve for life, as in the U.S.
Constitution “during good behavior,” but such “behavior” would be
a justiciable issue.48 The Philippine Constitutional Convention
worked from and modified Sumners’s draft to promulgate the
Constitution of 1935 that the Islands’ electorate adopted.49
41. Raymond Moley & Celeste Jedel, The Gentleman Who Does Not Yield:
Hatton Sumners, Dallas Diogenes, SATURDAY EVENING POST, May 10, 1941, 100
(1940) [hereafter Moley & Jedel]; Whitehurst, Sumners, supra note 21, at 4.
42. BEN R. GUTTERY, REPRESENTING TEXAS: A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY
U.S. AND CONFEDERATE SENATORS AND REPRESENTATIVES FROM TEXAS (1988)
AT 144-45 [hereinafter GUTTERY, REPRESENTING TEXAS].
43. Hatton W. Sumners, In Place of Impeachment—Trial by Judges, 3 TEX..
B.J. 480 (1940); Whitehurst, Sumners, supra note 21, at 4-5.
44. An unattributed, undated, typed document in the Sumners Papers
identifies those decisions as the Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929); Jurney
v. McCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935); Edwards v. U.S., 286 U.S. 482 (1932); and
the subsequently discussed Bekins v. U.S. case, notes 196 & 246 infra and text
accompanying.
45. Moley & Jedel, supra note 41.
46. FDR to HWS, June 19, 1934, Sumners Papers.
47. Cf. U.S. CONST. with Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippine
Islands by Hatton W. Sumners, Chairman on Judiciary, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, D.C., July 4, 1934, typescript, Sumners Papers
[hereinafter, HWS Draft of Philippine Constitution].
48. Cf. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1 with HWS Draft of Philippine Constitution,
art. “The Judicial,” 1st ¶, at 15.
49. HWS Draft of Philippine Constitution, supra note 47; Dallas Man’s Aid
Asked in Drafting Filipinos’ Charter, DALL. MORNING NEWS, May 28, 1934, at
3; Sumners Will Leave for Dallas on Monday, DALL. MORNING NEWS, July 9,
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In 1939, a Life magazine poll rated Sumners most highly for
integrity and second in overall ability among all Representatives in
the House.50 A “confirmed bachelor” with “a physical constitution
that was never robust,” Sumners was devoted to his work,
somewhat old fashioned and careless in his dress, and
parsimonious.51 One woman who lobbied him in the late thirties
described him as “an old gentleman who’d been in the House forever
and a day . . . the epitome of the Southern conservative [who] even
wore a frock coat. He looked like a relic of the past.”52 A 1937 audiovideo recording of Sumners in front of the Capitol, speaking in broad
generalities about the court-packing crisis, discloses an oldfashioned public-speaking style.53
Sumners asserted that his politics were undergirded by his
study and interpretation of natural law and Western legal history
back to what he considered the source, “the Germanic tribes.”54
When he retired to Dallas in 1947, he took up residence in a
dormitory of the law school of Southern Methodist University and
worked in and for its programs of legal studies.55 Ten years later he
1934, at 6 (Sumners’s “suggested Constitution . . . has been sent to Manila for
study”). A blackline of the final version against his draft shows many core
elements of his draft in the text promulgated by the Philippine convention and
approved by its electorate on May 14, 1935. Conrado Benitez, The New
Philippine Constitution, 8 PAC. AFFAIRS 428 (1935); Constitution of the
Philippines, 17 INT’L CONCILIATION 137 (1936) (text of the document as
adopted).
50. Washington Correspondents Name Ablest in Life Poll, LIFE MAG., Mar.
20, 1939, at 13, 15.
51. Senator Frederick Van Nuys, The Work of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 4 FED. BAR ASS'N J. 338 (1942) (“Hatton Sumners is a confirmed
bachelor and has had his own sweet, imperial way domestically, politically,
socially and financially all his life.”). The Sumners Papers and newspapers
indicate his frequent illnesses and indispositions along with at least two
surgeries. He also mentioned a recurrent problem with “nerves.” Sumners
worked very hard, complaining to a Dallas friend that in 1937 “I had three days’
vacation.” HWS to W.R. Harris, July 3, 1938, Sumners Papers. Drew Pearson
reported that Sumners had the “habit of not taking off his pajamas during the
daytime, if he was going to spend the coming night away from home.” Drew
Pearson, Washington Merry Go Round, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Mar. 13, 1946,
at 2. “His stinginess was legendary on Capitol Hill,” including often sleeping in
his office, never paying a fare if someone else was in the taxi, and occasionally
eating from others’ — including Sam Rayburn’s — plates in the Congressional
cafeteria. Anthony Champagne, Hatton Sumners and the 1937 Court-Packing
Plan, 26 E. TEX. HIST. J. 46, 47 (1988) [hereinafter Champagne, Sumners and
the Court-Packing Plan].
52. VIRGINIA FOSTER DURR, OUTSIDE THE MAGIC CIRCLE: THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF VIRGINIA FOSTER DURR (1985) at 128.
53. CriticalPast, Texas Congressman,Hatton W. Sumners,delivers speech
opposed to FDR's Court-Packin...HD Stock Footage, YOUTUBE (Jun. 17, 2014)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CsYJm1V6xHU [perma.cc/B2Z6-YWNG].
54. See, e.g., Hatton W. Sumners, Are We Observing the Natural Laws Which
Govern Governments, 55 AM. BAR ASS’N, ANNUAL REPORT 300 (1932).
55. GUTTERY, REPRESENTING TEXAS, HATTON WILLIAM SUMNERS, supra
note 42, at 145; Hatton Summers to Direct Research at Legal Center, DALL.
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published his only book, a rambling discursus explaining his
historical understandings of the Constitution and of law, arguing
against dangers he perceived in the modern administrative state,
and pleading for citizen involvement in politics.56
It was 1928 when Sumners first encountered Franklin
Roosevelt.57 After the Democratic Party candidate Al Smith lost the
presidential election, FDR won election as Governor of New York
and immediately reached out to Sumners, inviting him to the
forthcoming gubernatorial inauguration and urging him to
participate in the national Democratic Party organization.58 The
Congressman responded amiably but declined the invitation to
Albany.59 A handwritten notation at the top of Sumners’s response
letter in FDR’s archival file reads: “Successful Congressman.”60
Once FDR won the presidency in 1932, it was Sumners who
contacted the President-Elect to offer his ideas and assistance with
legislation to address the Depression.61
Throughout his career, Sumners freely expressed racist views
of African Americans in speeches and legislative work.62 By 1922,
Sumners acquired a national reputation for supporting the
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 29, 1949, at 1.
56. HATTON W. SUMNERS, THE PRIVATE CITIZEN AND HIS DEMOCRACY
(1959).
57. Reliable biographies of FDR include BRANDS, TRAITOR TO HIS CLASS,
supra note 19; ROBERT DALLEK, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: A POLITICAL LIFE
(2017); JEAN EDWARD SMITH, FDR (2007); KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR: THE NEW
DEAL YEARS 1933-1937 (1986); JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE
LION AND THE FOX, Vol. I (1956) [hereinafter BURNS, THE LION].
58. HWS to FDR, Dec. 18, 1928, Dem. Nat’l Comm., 1932 Texas Pre
Convention Corr., Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library & Museum, Hyde
Park, N.Y., National Archives and Records Administration. In these footnotes,
Roosevelt’s archive is called the FDR Library.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. HWS to FDR, Nov. 30, 1932, FDR Library. The President replied with
“appreciation” for “your very important suggestion.” FDR to HWS, Dec. 28,
1932, FDR Library.
62. In this article, “the words ‘race,’ ‘racism,’ and ‘race relations’ are . . . used
as shorthand for specific historical legacies that have nothing to do with
biological determinism, and everything to do with power relations.”
JACQUELINE JONES, A DREADFUL DECEIT: THE MYTH OF RACE FROM THE
COLONIAL ERA TO OBAMA’S AMERICA xvii (2013). The term “racial thinking” is
also used to mean “cognitive and emotional” prejudice; the term is
interchangeable with “racial discrimination” which is “the exercise of power to
create and reinforce social inequality between racially defined groups.” Emilio
Zamora, Connecting Causes, Alonso S. Perales, Hemispheric Universal and
Mexican Rights in the United States, in MICHAEL A. OLIVAS, IN DEFENSE OF MY
PEOPLE: ALONSO S. PERALES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEXICAN-AMERICAN
PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS 287, 311 n.3 (2013); see also Charles R. Lawrence III,
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (calling for recognition and “reckon[ing] with” racism.).
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maintenance of white supremacy by leading the opposition in the
House to bills repeatedly introduced, to make lynching a federal
crime and by opposing immigration.63 Perpetrated mainly but not
exclusively in the South, lynchings had a long and sordid history.64
After Representative Leonidas C. Dyer of St. Louis introduced
another of his bills in 1921 to make lynching a federal crime,
Sumners filed an oppositional minority report as a House Judiciary
Committee member; and in January 1922, he repulsively detailed
his racial thinking in a peroration on the House floor that he had
printed and sent, sometimes in stacks of five and ten, to recipients
across the South and the West.65 That year the second Ku Klux Klan
took over Dallas County,66 and in June, Sumners was surprised to
learn from constituents that a Klan candidate opposed his reelection. Sumners insisted he was “not a member of the organization
and [had] no direct or indirect affiliation with it” but “the same is
true with respect to the anti-[KKK] organization.”67 He sent an
63. See, e.g., Foreign Born Cause of Labor Troubles, DALL. MORNING NEWS,
Nov. 29, 1919 at 4.
64. See CHRISTOPHER WALDREP, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: A HISTORY IN
DOCUMENTS (2006); LYNCHING BEYOND DIXIE: AMERICAN MOB VIOLENCE
OUTSIDE THE SOUTH (Michael J. Pfeifer ed., 2013).
65. An excerpt:
I want to challenge the slanders which have been heaped upon the South
by a lot of these hired Negro agitators and white negroettes . . . . Away
back yonder . . . the men from New England . . . brought their shiploads
of slaves from the jungles of Africa and sold them to my people. It was a
tragedy, in so far as the white people were concerned . . . . but it was not
a tragedy in so far as the black man was concerned. . . .
That day never will come . . . when the black man and the white man
will stand upon a plane of social equality in this country. . . .
Now, I will be very candid . . . . The big difficulty is when the crime of
rape is committed against a white woman. . . . you do not know where
the beast is among them. . . . They say that lynching is an American
institution. Well, it is. . . .
HWS, speech, 62 CONG. REC.1774-1786 (Jan. 26, 1922). That speech has been
quoted by historians of lynching and of civil rights. See, e.g., MICHAEL PHILLIPS,
WHITE METROPOLIS: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND RELIGION IN DALLAS, 1841-2001, at
80 (2006) (quoting the speech and characterizing Sumners in the early 1920s as
a “Klan sympathizer”); DARWIN PAYNE, BIG D: TRIUMPHS AND TROUBLES OF AN
AMERICAN SUPERCITY IN THE 20TH CENTURY 77 (1994) (also categorizing
Sumners as a “Klan sympathizer”). One of the few historians to delve into
Sumners’s career puts it this way: “his southern heritage may have prevented
him from seeing another point of view regarding anti-lynching laws. He was not
alone [among] his Texas colleagues; only one, San Antonio congressman Maury
Maverick, supported anti-lynching legislation in the 1930’s.” Monroe, A Day in
July, supra note 21 at 41.
66. LINDA GORDON, THE SECOND COMING OF THE KKK: THE KU KLUX KLAN
OF THE 1920S AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (2017); Kevin G. Partz,
Political Turmoil in Dallas: The Electoral Whipping of the Dallas County
Citizens League by the Ku Klux Klan, 119 SW. HIST. Q. 148 (2015).
67. HWS to Hiram A. Lively, June 17, 1922, Sumners Papers. Dr. J.M.
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emissary to the Klan’s Dallas leader, and the opponent received
very few votes in the race while all other KKK candidates swept to
victory.68
Sumners was a classic Southern Democratic Congressman,
intent on protecting the region’s system of segregation and racial
oppression, always arguing for “states’ rights,” widely understood in
the South as code for protecting Jim Crow,69 and distrusting the
federal government. However, the predicament of Texan and
Southern farmers and his urban constituents in the maw of the
Great Depression led Sumners along with most Texas congressmen
to look to the New Deal for help.70 He exemplifies the thesis posited
by political scientist and historian Ira Katznelson that Southern
Democratic members of Congress entered into an implicit “compact”
with Roosevelt by which they were relieved of fear or concern about
the federal government seeking to undo the systematic oppression
of persons of color in the South in exchange for the legislators’ active
participation in the New Deal.71 So freed, the Southerners
collaborated “giddily” with the White House “to achieve their own
long-standing desire to regulate and control the market” and
Jones, whom Sumners acknowledged to be “a very good friend of mine,” directly
requested him to join: “Am enclosing blank which is self-explanatory” — the
attached printed form was for membership in the KKK — “[because] we know
you to be a Klansman at heart.” The letter warned that a Klansman “is in the
field against you and working hard” but concluded that “with this armament
[KKK membership] your election is assured.” J.M. Jones to HWS, June 15, 1922,
Sumners Papers.
68. Sumners conferred about the request with several Dallas confidants, and
then he asked one, lawyer William H. Harris, to “get in touch” with Jones and
“with your high class diplomacy handle the situation.” HWS to William H.
Harris, June 23, 1922, Sumners Papers. See Returns Canvassed by Democratic
Conventions, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Aug. 27, 1922, at 2 (Sumners: 7,579 votes;
his opponent: 1,119).
69. See JERROLD M PACKARD, AMERICAN NIGHTMARE: THE HISTORY OF JIM
CROW 130 (2002) (“the guise of ‘states rights’”); STEPHEN D. CLASSEN,
WATCHING JIM CROW: THE STRUGGLE OVER MISSISSIPPI TV, 1955-1969 112
(2004) (“direct address of racial struggle was deflected thorough the use of code
terms such as ‘states rights’”).
70. “Sam Rayburn, M[ar]vin Jones, James Buchanan, and Hatton Sumners
were among the influential congressmen who chaired key committees and
pushed New Deal legislation forward . . . . Senators Tom Connally and Morris
Sheppard exerted similar influence in the Senate, with their friend Garner
presiding over the Senate.” PATRICK COX, THE FIRST TEXAS NEWS BARONS 105
(2005); see also Ron Biles, The New Deal in Dallas, 95 SW. HIST. Q. 1, 7-8, 15
(1991); Dorothy De Moss, Resourcefulness in the Financial Capital: Dallas,
1929-1933, in TEXAS CITIES IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION at 117 (1973)
[hereinafter De Moss, Dallas, 1929-1933].
71. IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF
OUR TIME 158, 160, 162 (2013) [hereinafter KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF]; see also
K. Heineman, Asserting States’ Rights, Demanding Federal Assistance: Texas
Democrats in the Era of the New Deal, 28 J. POLICY HIST. 342 (2016).
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otherwise to foster “liberal democratic government.”72
Sumners collaborated and cooperated with the White House on
many New Deal bills and consistently assisted the administration
in legislative matters in the House with the exception of certain
White House-proposed criminal legislation that he regarded as
poorly drafted or too invasive of the traditional sphere of state
criminal law.73 To a constituent in mid-1938, Sumners wrote: “I
make no claims for myself, but insofar as the Congress is concerned,
from the beginning of the administration until now I doubt that any
President in the history of the country has been more consistently
supported.”74 A contemporaneous Dallas Morning News article
found that of thirteen key New Deal legislative measures, Sumners
supported all but one, and he ended up voting for that one as well
on final passage.75
A corollary to Katznelson’s thesis is that in 1937 most
Southerners in Congress fought the court-packing plan, despite
their deal with the President, because they feared that the increase
in executive power the plan represented might be marshaled
against Jim Crow.76 Sumners’s legislative work to resolve the courtpacking crisis is, however, an exception or qualification to that
corollary. This congressman’s racism persisted throughout the
Roosevelt presidency but did not prevent him from formulating and
obtaining enactment of legislation that solved the New Deal’s
litigation problem for the President.
Because Sumners chaired the House Judiciary Committee,
FDR included him and his counterpart Henry F. Ashurst, Chairman
of the Senate’s Judiciary Committee, in the February 5th White
House gathering to announce the court-packing plan. As Sumners’s
former secretary, legislative assistant, and lifelong associate,
72. Id.
73. Champagne, Sumners and the Court-Packing Plan, supra note 51, at 47.
One example of collaboration: Sumners to FDR, Feb. 17, 1933, FDR Library
(reporting Sumners’s meeting with “a group of industrialists interested in
modification of the antitrust laws” including Howard Chapin, the automobile
engineer and industrialist, and offering to meet with the President about it);
FDR to W.H. McIntyre, Feb. 1933 (directing acceptance of Sumners’s offer). As
Glock put it, “Although the wisecracking conservative from Texas was
suspicious of much of the New Deal, he was also a loyal Democratic Party
soldier. As Chairman of the Judiciary Committee [he] worked diligently to pass
Roosevelt’s agenda.” Glock, Unpacking, supra note 18, at 59. For an example of
Sumners declining to support FDR’s criminal legislation, see Minutes of FDR
meeting (“Crime Bills. The President: Th[is] series of bills . . . has run into a
snag in [the Judiciary] Committee and it is because Judge Sumners holds to a
[states’ rights] school of thought.”). See also ONOFRIO, Sumners, supra note 21,
at 297.
74. HWS to J.S. Durham, Apr. 18, 1938, Sumners Papers; see also HWS to
W.R. Harris, July 3, 1938, Sumners Papers (“While I have not supported the
administration 100%, I have supported the Administration. Anybody who
agrees 100% is not supporting; he is riding,” (emphasis added)).
75. Sumners Record on New Deal, DALL. MORNING NEWS, July 3, 1938, at 9.
76. KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF, supra note 71, at 178-79.
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Elmore Whitehurst, later wrote, “February 5, 1937, was a critical
date in the life and career of Hatton W. Sumners.”77 The President’s
proposal for authority to appoint of up to six more justices to the
Supreme Court provoked an enormous public dispute; ultimately,
seven months later, Roosevelt lost and reluctantly abandoned the
plan. Sumners played a primary role in causing that outcome while
at the same time enacting bills that solved the litigation problem
that motivated the President’s proposal.

III.THE NEW DEAL’S LITIGATION PROBLEM AND
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT’S PROPOSED COURTPACKING SOLUTION
In the dire circumstances of 1932, with the Great Depression
worsening, Roosevelt stepped forward and won the presidency in a
landslide, with a popular vote count of 22,800,000 to 15,750,000,
and the Democratic Party secured firm control of both houses of
Congress.78 With ample political power throughout his first term to
effectuate his agenda, Roosevelt’s presidency promptly generated a
surge of innovative legislation commonly known as the New Deal,
tackling the economic and social problems of the Great Depression
with both temporary relief for the unemployed and destitute
including jobs and infrastructure programs and long-term reforms
such as the National Industrial Recovery Act (the “NIRA”),
monetary reforms, the National Labor Relations Act (the “Wagner
Act”), securities regulation, the Agricultural Adjustment Act (the
“AAA”), and Social Security.79
77. Whitehurst, Sumners, supra note 21, at 6-7. Whitehurst joined
Sumners’s Washington office as Secretary in 1927 upon college graduation and
served from 1933 to 1939 as Clerk of the House Judiciary Committee. Later he
served in the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts and as a bankruptcy judge in
Dallas. Referee Elmore Whitehurst Resigns As Editor of the Journal, 44 J. NAT'L
CONF. REF. BANKR. 2, 8 (1970).
78. BRANDS, TRAITOR TO HIS CLASS, supra note 19, at 265.
79. A classic account by the eminent historian Bill Brands describes
succinctly Roosevelt’s New Deal:
The program was definitely broad. . . . the Banking Act, . . . the GlassSteagall Act, . . . the Economy Act, . . . the law establishing the Civilian
Conservation Corps, . . . the Agricultural Adjustment Act, . . . the
Tennessee Valley Authority, . . . the National Industrial Recovery Act, .
. . . laws provided emergency relief to the poor and jobless, debt relief to
farmers, and mortgage relief to home owners. . . . Roosevelt took the
United States off the gold standard, undoing sixty years of American
monetary policy.
It was a breathtaking record . . . .
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Sumners participated in legislating the New Deal by drafting
or facilitating the passage of statutes pertaining to reform and
modernization of the federal legal system including the addition of
the railroad-reorganization chapter to the national bankruptcy law
in 193380 and general corporate reorganization and municipal
bankruptcy in 1934,81 authorizations for interstate compacts,82 lawenforcement amendments to address the nationwide crime wave
such as authorizing Department (later, Federal Bureau) of
Investigation agents to make arrests,83 and numerous revisions to
criminal law,84 grand jury proceedings,85 criminal procedure,86 and
civil process.87 Sumners worked collaboratively with Attorney
General Homer Cummings. For instance, in 1936, Sumners
sponsored a Justice Department-drafted statute making businessrecords evidence admissible in federal courts.88
Unsurprisingly, on behalf of both corporate and individual
clients unhappy with the changes wrought by the President and
Congress, lawyers challenged virtually all New Deal laws and
programs in the federal courts on multiple constitutional grounds.
By the second half of the President’s first term, certain measures
composing the New Deal began to encounter a problem in the
Supreme Court. During Roosevelt’s first term, the Court comprised
eight Associate Justices, Willis Van Devanter (appointed 1910),
Pierce Butler (1922), James Clark McReynolds (1914), Louis
Brandeis (1916), George Sutherland (1922), Harlan Fiske Stone
(1925), Owen J. Roberts (1930), and Benjamin N. Cardozo (1932),
together with the Chief Justice of the United States, Charles Evans
Hughes (1930).89 All of the Justices were, of course, serving lifetime

Brands, Traitor to His Class, supra note 19, at 352.
80. H.R. 14359, 72d Cong., P.L. 420, 47 Stat. 467 (1933).
81. H.R. 5884, 73d Cong., P.L. 296, 48 Stat. 911 (1934).
82. H.R. 7353, 73d Cong., P.L. 293, 48 Stat. 909, (1934).
83. H.R. 9476, 73d Cong., P.L. 402, 48 Stat. 1008, (1934).
84. H.R. 5091, 73d Cong., P.L. 62, 48 Stat. 152 (1934); H.R. 5208, P.L. 74, 48
Stat. 256 (1934); H.R. 8912, 73d Cong., P.L. 394, 48 Stat. 996 (1934); H.R. 6717,
74th Cong., P.L. 174, 49 Stat. 427, (1935).
85. H.R. 7748, 73d Cong., P.L. 180, 48 Stat. 648, (1934);
86. H.R. 7748, P.L. 180 (1934); H.R. 5091, P.L. 62, 48 Stat. 152 (1933).
87. S. 3040, 73d Cong., P.L. 416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934); see Jay S. Goodman,
On the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: What Did
the Drafters Intend?, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 351 (1987). The Rules Enabling
Act of 1934 originated in the Senate, and Sumners managed the bill in the
House. Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 PENN. L. REV.
1015, 1100 n. 385 (“Sumners was the House manager”).
88. H.R. 11690, 74th Cong. P.L. 734, 49 Stat. 1561 (1936); A letter to Hatton
W. Sumners, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, H.R. REP. NO. 2357,
Feb. 29, 1936, reprinted in CARL BRENT SWISHER, EDITOR. SELECTED PAPERS
OF HOMER CUMMINGS, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 1933-1939
(1939) 261-62 [hereinafter PAPERS OF HOMER CUMMINGS] (requesting Sumners
to carry the bill].
89. Glock, Unpacking, supra note 18, at 48; Federal Judicial Center,
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appointments with constitutional protection against diminution in
compensation.90 In 1935, when the Court began to issue decisions
that held notable New Deal enactments unconstitutional, the
justices’ ages ranged from seventy to seventy-seven; their ages were
much higher than the American male life expectancy of sixty.91
Columnist Drew Pearson lampooned the bench as “the Nine Old
Men.”92
President Herbert Hoover had appointed the last three
justices: Hughes as Chief Justice after William Howard Taft
resigned due to ill health, Roberts to fill the place of Edward T.
Sanford, who died in office on the same day in 1930 that Taft died,
and Cardozo to replace Oliver Wendell Holmes who resigned at age
ninety on January 12, 1932.93 The appointment of Hughes as Chief
Justice was significant because, as Felix Frankfurter later wrote
about the crisis, Hughes served as “the head of two courts, so
different . . . was the supreme bench in the two periods of the decade
during which Hughes presided.”94 During Roosevelt’s first term,
four justices formed a bloc generally dedicated to laissez-faire or
substantive due process jurisprudence. Justices Van Devanter,
Butler, McReynolds, and Sutherland, as FDR’s presidency
progressed, became popularly known as the “Four Horsemen” for
their adamant opposition to the New Deal.95
Initially, the Hughes Court seemed friendly to innovative
legislation to remediate the Depression. It upheld several state laws
adopted in response to the bleak financial conditions, such as the
mortgage-foreclosure moratorium law in Home Building & Loan
Association v. Blaisdell96 and regulation of milk prices in Nebbia v.

Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789-Present,
www.fjc.gov/history/judges [perma.cc/ET8H-UAUL].
90. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
91. Andrew Noymer, Life expectancy in the USA, 1900-98,
www.u.demog.berkeley.edu/~andrew/1918/figure2.html
[perma.cc/R3XHAXT6].
92. DREW PEARSON & ROBERT S. ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN 119 (1937).
93. OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Hughes, Charles Evans at 415, 416 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992) [hereinafter,
OXFORD COMPANION]; id., Taft, William Howard at 854, 856; id., Cardozo,
Benjamin Nathan at 126, 127; id., Holmes, Oliver Wendell at 405, 410.
94. FELIX FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 148 (1956).
95. Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling
of the States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 493 n. 28 (1997) (‘The Four Horsemen of
the Apocalypse’ or ‘of Reaction’ was the pejorative nickname given to the four
sternest opponents”).
96. 290 U.S. 398 (1934); see JOHN A. FLITER & DEREK S. HOFF, FIGHTING
FORECLOSURE: THE BLAISDELL CASE, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE, AND THE GREAT
DEPRESSION (2012) (explaining that in this case the state law did not
unconstitutionally impair the mortgage contract but rather simply extended the
time for performance).
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New York,97 and in February 1935, it sustained Roosevelt’s
monetary program and the legislation that terminated the gold
standard for U.S. currency in the Gold Clause Cases.98 In those
cases, the Chief Justice and Roberts teamed with Brandeis, Stone,
and Cardozo for the majority, with the Four Horsemen dissenting.
The Court in fact overruled most constitutionality challenges
brought against New Deal programs.99 For example, in 1936 the
Court upheld the Tennessee Valley Authority and on January 4,
1937, the same with the Ashurst-Sumners Act.100
Beginning in early 1935, however, and continuing through
mid-1936, Roberts joined the Four Horseman in several 5-4
decisions, and the more progressive justices occasionally joined for
majorities, that invalidated multiple measures of the New Deal’s
legislative program:
January 7, 1935: Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan101 (by 8-1 vote)—the
“hot oil” provision of the NIRA;
May 6, 1935, 1935: Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad102
(5-4)—the Railroad Retirement Act, requiring railroads to
contribute funding to a pension for retirees;
On “Black Monday,” as FDR’s supporters called it, May 27, 1935:
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S.103 (9-0)—the “codes of fair
competition” provision of the NIRA, and Louisville Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Radford104 (9-0)— farmers’ bankruptcy relief
under the Frazier-Lemke Act;
January 6, 1936: U.S. v. Butler105 (6-3)—the AAA;
May 18, 1936: Carter v. Carter Coal Co.106 (6-3)—the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1935 (the “Coal Act”);
May 25, 1936: Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District
No. One107 (5-4)—the first Municipal Bankruptcy Act; and,
June 1, 1936: Morehead v. N.Y. ex rel. Tipaldo108 (4-3)—a state’s
minimum-wage law.

97. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
98. Norman v. Balt. & O. R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Nortz v. U.S., 294 U.S.
317 (1935); Perry v. U.S., 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
99. S. REP. NO. 711 at 47-48 (June 14, 1937) (counting 23 decisions holding
legislation enacted in FDR’s first term constitutional).
100. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936); Ky. Whip &
Collar Co. v. Ill. Cent. RR., 299 U.S. 334 (1937) [hereinafter, Ky. Whip & Collar
v. Ill. Cent.] (sustaining a law Sumners and Ashurst had jointly sponsored
regulating interstate shipment of prison-made goods).
101. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
102. 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
103. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
104. 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
105. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
106. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
107. 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
108. 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
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During these two years, according to the Senate Judiciary
Committee’s mid-1937 count, the Court held New Deal enactments
unconstitutional in a total of twelve cases,109 numbers aberrantly
high as measured and compared across U.S. history.110 Two of those
decisions, Radford and Ashton, invalidated bankruptcy-law
amendments that came out of Sumners’s committee, Sumners
himself having authored the statute in the latter case.
While the unconstitutionality rulings were limited to arguably
minor laws,111 the legal efforts to derail the New Deal during FDR’s
first term were quite broad as shown by federal district courts
granting more than 2,000 injunctions against the operation or
implementation of a variety of challenged New Deal programs.112
FDR regarded those adverse litigation outcomes — to many of
which the government was not even a party — as a serious rebuke
to the New Deal.113 During 1935 and 1936 he called both Sumners
and Ashurst to the White House for consultations, and other
members of Congress reacted by filing bills to deny the Supreme
Court the authority to make constitutionality rulings, to require a
two-thirds vote to invalidate a law, and to amend Article III of the
Constitution to increase the seats on the bench, none of which went
anywhere.114
After his sixty-one percent landslide reelection on November 3,
1936, the President believed that he had a renewed mandate for his
New Deal. Two weeks after the second inauguration, he took the
dramatic step of his February 5th announcement of the plan he had
worked out with Attorney General Cummings but shared with very
109. Senate Comm. on The Judiciary, Reorganization of the Federal
Judiciary, S. Rep. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 at 46-47 (1937). The other
four decisions identified by the committee were unanimous: Booth v. U.S., 291
U.S. 339 (1934), Lynch v. U.S., 292 U.S. 571 (1934), Perry v. U.S., 294 U.S. 330
(1935), and Hopkins Ass’n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315 (1935).
110. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court
as a National Policy-Maker, 50 EMORY L. J. 563, 572-73 (2001) (for example, the
author found that 92% of New Deal legislation that was invalidated was
overturned on in less than two years, whereas for all other presidents’
legislative programs that were overturned in that same amount of time the
percentage was only 20%).
111. Id.
112. See text accompanying notes 147, 227-31 infra and text accompanying.
113. Roosevelt “was not willing to permit the Court to strangle more of the
New Deal programs . . . . or to impede the new reform programs that he intended
to champion during his second term.” William G. Ross, The Hughes Court, 19301941: Evolution and Revolution at 235, in THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 235 (Christopher Tomlins ed., 2005)
[hereinafter Ross, Hughes Court].
114. 'Hill' Shuns Fight to Curb High Court, WASHINGTON POST, Apr 2, 1936,
at 1; see also William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's
"Court-Packing" Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 347, 359-62 [hereinafter
Leuchtenburg, Origins].
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few to overcome what he considered the judicial roadblock to the
accomplishment of his full legislative agenda.115 His plan did not
involve constitutional amendment, which would have taken a long
time with an uncertain result, but rather used the expedient of
increasing the Supreme Court’s membership legislatively from nine
to a possible maximum of fifteen.
As the extensive and still-developing literature about the
proposal discloses,116 the court-packing plan was a watershed event
in Roosevelt’s presidency and in American law and history, a
national experience that continues to reverberate to the present
day. As unveiled on February 5, 1937, the core of the President’s
proposal was authorization to nominate one additional justice for
every sitting member who had served ten or more years and had
declined to retire at the age of seventy, up to a maximum of fifteen
justices.117 The President attempted to disguise his court-packing
scheme in judicial-reform rhetoric, and he observed that the plan
was not without precedent. Earlier precedents included the
Federalist Congress’s reducing the number of justices in 1801 to
deny the new President, Thomas Jefferson, an appointment and the
Reconstruction-era Congress’s manipulating the number of justices
to deny any appointment to President Andrew Johnson.118
115. Breckinridge Long, Diary, Jan. 8, 1937 at 16, Breckinridge Long
Papers, Library of Congress (after a lunch this day with the Attorney General,
the diplomat noted that “Homer [Cummings] has devised a means and has a
draft”). This was a move that, according to some reports, Roosevelt and his
Attorney General, Homer Cummings, had been contemplating since early in the
first term, when they had been concerned that the Supreme Court might
invalidate the early monetary reform measures. Glock, Unpacking, supra note
18, at 58-60.
116. A February 4, 2021 search in the Law Journal Library of HeinOnline
for the term “court-packing plan” yielded citations to 2,751 law-review articles.
A few examples: Joshua Braver, Court-Packing: An American Tradition?, 61
B.C. L. REV. 2747 (2020); Stephan O. Kline, Revisiting FDR's Court Packing
Plan: Are the Current Attacks on Judicial Independence So Bad?, 30 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 863 (1999). Monographs abound. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. SWINDLER,
COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, THE NEW LEGALITY,
1932-1968 (1970); BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE
STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998); MARIAN MCKENNA,
FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL WAR [hereinafter
MCKENNA, CONSTITUTIONAL WAR]: THE COURT-PACKING CRISIS OF 1937 (2002);
BURT SOLOMON, FDR V. THE CONSTITUTION: THE COURT-PACKING FIGHT AND
THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY (2009; WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE
SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF
ROOSEVELT (1995); SHESOL, SUPREME POWER, supra note 1. In print also are
numerous articles in historical journals, political science analyses, and writings
about the federal court system.
117. Texts of Roosevelt's Court Message, His Proposed Bill and Cummings's
Letter, N.Y. TIMES, Feb 6, 1937, at 1, 8, 19-20.
118. Before 1869 the number of justices ranged from three to ten. Creation
of the Federal Judiciary, The Organization of the Supreme Court, S. Doc. 91,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 27, 1937), at 254 (providing a short history of the
various congressional acts that changed the number of positions on the Court
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The most recent precedent had occurred early in President
Woodrow Wilson’s administration when Attorney General James
McReynolds (later, as Justice McReynolds, one of the Four
Horsemen) proposed that the President be authorized to appoint an
additional district or circuit court judge “for any pension-eligible
judge over age seventy who refused to resign.”119 The 1919 law
entitled a judge who had served at least ten years — “other than a
justice of the Supreme Court” — to “retire, upon the salary of which
he is then in receipt, from regular active service on the bench, and
the President shall thereupon be authorized to appoint a
successor.”120 As a new member of the House Judiciary Committee
in 1919, Sumners had attended the hearings on that bill, and FDR,
a lawyer by education serving in 1919 as Assistant Secretary of the
Navy, was also familiar with the enactment.121 The 1919 judicial
retirement law excluded the Supreme Court122, so unlike all lower
federal judges, the justices had no option for retirement with
protection against diminishment of compensation but only the
choice of working in office until death or else resignation with an
unguaranteed federal pension.
In his February 5th announcement, the President argued that
many of the justices were too elderly to keep the caseloads current
and the dockets of lower federal courts were also clogged.123 So as
announced on February 5, 1937, FDR’s plan included several
practical provisions to encourage votes for the bill: an additional
fifty federal judgeships for the trial and intermediate-appellate
benches, authorization for the Chief Justice to rearrange lowercourt judges’ assignments, and creation of a position of federalcourts “monitor” to facilitate the flow of litigation.124 Together with
the central proposal to enlarge the membership of the Supreme
Court, Roosevelt characterized these elements as a unified plan
called the Judicial Reform Bill.125
Congressman Sumners, the “best lawyer in Congress,” was
beginning with the First Congress). Congress established the number of justices
at nine by statute in 1869. Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of
Article III Federal Judges, 1789-Present, www.fjc.gov/history/judges
[https://perma.cc/ET8H-UAUL]. While many Americans in 1937 believed that
the number of nine seats on the Supreme Court’s bench is constitutionally
ordained, the Constitution simply establishes the Court and leaves to Congress
its staffing. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
119. Glock, Unpacking, supra note 18, at 52.
120. 40 Stat., ch. 29, § 6 (1919).
121. Glock, Unpacking, supra note 18, at 54.
122. Id.
123. S. REP. NO. 711, Appx. A, Message from the President of the United
States Transmitting a Recommendation to Reorganize the Judicial Branch of
the Federal Government (Feb. 5, 1937), at 26.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 27.
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aware of and understood the legal problem for Roosevelt’s New Deal
posed by the opposition of a five-justice majority comprising the
Four Horsemen plus Justice Roberts. As Whitehurst later wrote,
Sumners “realized that the time had come for an infusion of new
and younger blood on the Court.”126 As Sumners expressed it in
retrospect to a constituent: “I realized that too much age was
accumulating on that court and that the court was going too far in
the field where governmental policy is fixed. I went to work on the
matter two years before anybody else touched it.”127 His reference
was to bills he had introduced earlier, in 1935.
The judicial restructuring proposal immediately aroused
widespread public opposition and provoked a torrent of negative
press coverage.128 “Throughout the period under consideration,
[media] coverage of the issue ran against President Roosevelt,” and
Gallup Polls showed consistently that opponents outnumbered the
President’s supporters on this issue.129 The plan dominated the
public agenda for “the 168 days,” as counted by Alsop and Catledge
in that first Saturday Evening Post article, until the date of July
22nd that they asserted to have been the moment of death of the
proposal, when the Senate voted to recommit to its Judiciary
Committee Senate Bill 1392 containing the President’s plan.130
Based on the importance of Sumners’s second statute, the date of
its signing, August 24th, is the more appropriate end date for the
crisis period.
Historians and legal commentators differ as to whether the
court-packing plan was doomed by the public opposition that today
is demonstrated in both the newspapers of 1937 and in the
avalanches of letters and telegrams in the archival papers of the key
politicians131 or, alternatively, whether it might have succeeded.132
But the court-packing plan did fail — spectacularly — and human
agency plays a significant part in the spinning out of the history of
126. Whitehurst, Sumners, supra note 21.
127. HWS to J.B. Durham, Apr. 18, 1938, Sumners Papers.
128. MERLO PUSEY, THE SUPREME COURT CRISIS 1 (1937) (“Street-corner
discussions, arguments at restaurant tables, a seemingly endless stream of
radio addresses and newspaper reports”).
129. Gregory A. Caldeira, Public Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court:
FDR's Court-Packing Plan, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1139, 1145 (1987) [hereinafter
Caldeira, Public Opinion].
130. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, 168 Days, supra note 3.
131. See, e.g., BURNS, THE LION, supra note 57, at 314 (1956); Lionel V.
Patenaude, Garner, Sumners, and Connally: The Defeat of the Roosevelt Court
Bill in 1937, 74 Sw. Hist. Q. 36, 51 (1970) [hereinafter Patenaude, Garner,
Sumners, and Connally]; MICHAEL E. PARRISH, THE HUGHES COURT: JUSTICES,
RULINGS, AND LEGACY 26 (2002); MCKENNA, CONSTITUTIONAL WAR, at 561-62.
132. See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial
Independence, 71 VAND. L. REV. 465, 509 (2018) [hereinafter Grove, Judicial
Independence] (arguing that “[t]he measure seemed likely to get through the
Senate, and all participants agreed that it would pass the House of
Representatives by a wide margin”).
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legal events. In the court-packing controversy, it was Hatton
Sumners who played a primary, albeit previously unappreciated,133
role by formulating, filing and procuring enactment of two judicial
bills that bookended the resolution of the crisis.

IV.SUMNERS’S TWO JUDICIAL BILLS AS BOOKENDS TO THE
CRISIS
a. March 1, 1937: The Retirement Act
On January 6, 1937, Vice President John Nance Garner
presided over the official counting of Electoral College votes134 that
had arrived at the Capitol by registered mail.135 One hour later,
both houses of Congress assembled for the State of the Union
address. Roosevelt adumbrated a proposal pertaining to the New
Deal’s litigation problem and the Supreme Court: “We do not ask
the courts to call nonexistent powers into being, but we have a right
to expect that conceded powers or those legitimately implied shall
be made effective instruments for the common good.”136 Alsop and
Catledge asserted that, of the audience in that chamber,
only Representative Hatton W. Sumners, of Texas, the upright,
learned chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, really believed
what his ears told him. He saw at once that something like the court
bill must be coming, and in an effort to avert it he promptly revived
his judiciary retirement bill.137

Within a few days, Sumners filed not one, but two bills
proposing solutions to the New Deal’s litigation problem, neither of
which shows signs of forced or hurried drafting. The first was House
Bill 2260, filed on January 8th, and providing that:
whenever in any court of the United States in any suit or proceeding
to which the United States or any agency thereof or any officer or
employee thereof, as such officer or employee, is not a party, the
validity of any statute of the United States is drawn in question, the
court having jurisdiction of the suit or proceeding shall certify such
133. Glock and Champagne are among the tiny handful of scholars to have
found Sumners “played a prominent role in the court-packing fight of 1937.”
Glock, Unpacking, supra note 18, at 54, Champagne, Sumners and the CourtPacking Plan, supra note 51, at 46, 47 (“a self-appointed brakeman” and “a
leading opponent of the plan”).
134. Rayburn Shows Up With Resolutions to Begin New Job, DALL.
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 6, 1937, at 1, 16.
135. H.R. 7373, 70th Cong., (1926, Supp. II, 1928) (sponsored by HWS).
136. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, ANNUAL MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, Jan. 6,
1937,
available
at
The
American
Presidency
Project,
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/209043 [perma.cc/2J7M-TWJC].
137. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS, supra note 3.
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fact to the Attorney General if the court is of opinion that a
substantial ground exists for questioning the validity of the statute
[and] afford an opportunity for presentation of evidence . . . and
argument on behalf of the United States by the Attorney General or
counsel designated by him [with] right of review of such decision in
the proper appellate court . . . .138

Coincidentally, in his diary entry that day, former Ambassador
to Italy, Breckinridge Long, noted that, over lunch, Attorney
General Cummings had been “in a communicative mood” about “the
situation vis a vis the Supreme Court,” and Cummings had
commented that “[h]e has been confronted . . . with the legal phases
of the bills and cases arising out of them as they have arrived before
the Supreme Court.”139 In other words, the Justice Department had
been uninvolved in many of the cases presenting constitutionality
issues decided by the Court.
Of the above-highlighted 1935-1936 cases invalidating New
Deal laws, in only three, Schechter, Panama Refining, and Butler,
was the government a party either by virtue of having defended or
asserted a claim or sought criminal enforcement against a private
party, and the Justice Department was simply not involved in any
of the others. The Judicial Code and the versions of the Revised
Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States effective during
Roosevelt’s first term did not contemplate the device of
intervention.140 Moreover, the permission of the Supreme Court just
to file a brief as amicus curiae was quite limited, available only by
“special leave,” even for the Justice Department.141 Not until 1937
did the Court formalize amicus practice by adding a rule
authorizing such briefs “by written consent of all parties.”142
A perfect example of the phenomenon of cases presenting
constitutionality issues arriving and being decided by the Supreme
Court without the government’s involvement is furnished by Ashton
overturning the Sumners-authored Municipal Bankruptcy Act. In
the Depression, several thousand cities, special-purpose districts,
and political subdivisions of states became insolvent, unable to pay
the bonds they had issued during the 1920s to finance civic
138. H.R. 2260, 75th Cong. (Jan. 8, 1937).
139. Diary of Breckinridge Long, at 14, Jan. 8, 1937, Breckinridge Long
Papers, Library of Congress (emphasis added).
140. REVISED RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
www.supremecourt.gov/ctrules/scannedrules.aspx
[perma.cc/F2QG-XPUV]
[hereinafter REVISED RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT].
141. The case law discloses only two examples during FDR’s first term of the
Justice Department having obtained “special leave” to file an amicus brief. See
Ky. Whip & Collar v. Ill. Cent., supra note 99; Holyoke Water Power Co. v. Am.
Writing Paper Co., 300 U.S. 324 (1937) (denying an attempt to sidestep the Gold
Clause Cases).
142. REVISED RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT, Rule 27, subdiv. 9. In the
1939 edition, rule 47 was added to address the Attorney General intervention,
with Sumners’s Intervention Act attached in its Appendix. Id., Rule 47, at 38 &
Appx. to Rules, Act of Aug. 24, 137, at 10 (1939).

2021]

The Instrumental Role of Congressman Hatton Sumners

403

improvements and, in the instance of dozens of water districts in
the Rio Grande Valley of Texas, to finance construction of the
irrigation facilities that had enabled a boom in citrus and truck
gardening.143 Sumners’s side business was lending and agricultural
land investment, and having spent time there, he was aware of the
Valley’s rapid development during the Twenties and appreciated
the Depression-induced problems of collapsed land values and
uncollectible taxes that prevented the irrigation and specialpurpose districts from servicing their bonds.144 Shortly before
Roosevelt’s inauguration in 1933, Sumners proposed an innovative
bankruptcy statute to authorize insolvent municipal debtors to
obtain from federal district courts approval of compositions,
agreements to refinance or reduce their debts, reached with their
creditors.
In early 1933, Sumners convened a hearing, received
testimony, and then personally harmonized all competing proposals
in a bill enacted a year later, the Municipal Bankruptcy Act or
“Chapter IX” of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.145 In the Valley, the
insolvent Cameron County Water Improvement District No. One
soon filed a Chapter IX case seeking confirmation of its composition.
One dissident bondholder questioned the Act’s constitutionality and
took the issue to the Supreme Court. The record on appeal discloses
that the Justice Department was never given any notice of the
constitutionality issue, and it filed no paper.146 It was up to the
private litigant, an insolvent irrigation district whose lead counsel
in the appeal had served in the district court as the bondholders’
counsel, to make the arguments for constitutionality. Sumners’s
experience with Ashton informed his preparation and filing on
January 8, 1937, of House Bill 2260, the Intervention Bill, to bring
the Attorney General into constitutionality issues at early moments
in cases.
Near the end of his February 5th message, the President
identified a closely related problem occurring in the trial courts:
[W]e find the processes of government itself brought to a complete
stop from time to time by injunctions issued almost automatically,
143. ALICIA M. DEWEY, PESOS AND DOLLARS: ENTREPRENEURS IN THE
TEXAS-MEXICO BORDERLANDS, 1880-1940 58-74, 102-03 (2014).
144. Sumners’s trips to South Texas, his investments in agricultural lands,
and his lending activities both before and during his 34 years in Congress are
documented in many files of the Sumners Papers.
145. H.R. Judiciary Committee, 75th Cong., Hearing on H.R. 1670, H.R.
3083, H.R. 4311, H.R. 5267 & H.R. 5009 (1933).
146. Record on Appeal, Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement
District
No.
One,
Archives,
HARVARD
LAW
SCHOOL,
play.google.com/books/reader?id=pyNA9e5YWycC&hl=en&pg=GBS.PP1.
Justice Cardozo, one of the dissenters in that case, placed this copy of the record
into that archive in 1937.
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sometimes even without notice to the Government. . . . Statutes which
the Congress enacts are set aside or suspended for long periods of
time, even in cases to which the Government is not a party. . . . [A]s
an immediate step, I recommend that the Congress provide that no .
. . injunction . . . on any constitutional question be promulgated by
any Federal court without previous and ample notice to the Attorney
General and an opportunity for the United States to present evidence
and be heard.147

But Roosevelt did not include such provisions in the draft bill
that the President appended to his message to Congress and that
Ashurst filed as Senate Bill 1392, almost certainly because the
President’s team knew of Sumners’s House Bill 2260, then on file
for a month and proposing such intervention rights to the Attorney
General.
Another judicial problem troubled Sumners. In early 1932,
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes resigned at age ninety after thirty
years’ service. Rather quickly Holmes’s pension was cut in half due
to President Hoover’s Economy Act that was enacted later that
year.148 Sumners was appalled. By resigning, Holmes had lost his
constitutional protection against reduction of compensation. The
penny-pinching reduction of all judicial pensions also upset several
of the justices. One of the Four Horsemen, Justice Van Devanter,
had been planning to step down in 1933, but the severe reduction of
Holmes’ pension caused him to stay in office so he could continue to
receive his full salary.149 Justice Sutherland felt the same way.150
Resignation would also have subjected these justices to income tax
on their pensions which they had not been paying on their judicial
salaries.151 Sumners was in touch with those justices and knew
their inclinations.
Two years earlier, in the first session of the 74th Congress,
Sumners had introduced the first Supreme Court retirement bill.
The bill would simply have brought the Supreme Court justices
under the retirement provisions that had covered all the lower
federal courts’ judges since 1919.152 On February 4, 1935, Attorney
General Cummings opined at Sumners’s request that “the

147. Presidential Message, 81 Cong. Rec. 879 (Feb. 5, 1937). In a nationwide
radio address on February 14th, Cummings had decried, in passing, “the
reckless use of the injunctive power” by district courts in New Deal
constitutionality cases. The President's Proposals for Judicial Reorganization,
(Feb. 14, 1937) in PAPERS OF HOMER CUMMINGS, supra note 88, at 150.
148. Legislative Appropriation Act of June 30, 1932, P.L. 212, 47 Stat. 382,
401 (1932).
149. Glock, Unpacking, supra note 18, at 16-18, 19-20.
150. Id. at 17-19.
151. Id. at 17. At that time, Justices were exempt from income taxation
under a decision authored by Van Devanter, Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920).
Shortly after Van Devanter’s departure, the Court held to the contrary in
O’Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939).
152. H.R. 5160, 75th Cong. (1937).

2021]

The Instrumental Role of Congressman Hatton Sumners

405

enactment of this measure is desirable.”153 The bill’s legal theory
was that, unlike a resigning justice, a retiring justice would remain
a justice for lifetime with protected compensation but would lose the
ability to sit in cases before the Supreme Court.154 For clarity,
Sumners’s final version added, as the 1919 law had provided: “the
President shall be authorized to appoint a successor to any such
Justice of the Supreme Court so retiring from regular active service
on the bench.”155 But his bill went nowhere. Another Texas
congressman, Thomas L. Blanton of Houston, a perennial grumbler
about federal expenditures with whom Sumners had tussled in the
past, derailed Sumner’s bill by complaining bitterly on the House
floor that the justices would have better retirement terms than
members of Congress.156
On January 11, 1937, just five days after FDR’s State of the
Union speech, and twenty-five days before the White House
announcement, Sumners re-introduced his 1935 retirement bill as
the second of his two judicial bills. Filed as House Bill 2518, it
provided:
Justices of the Supreme Court are hereby granted the same rights
and privileges with regard to retiring, instead of resigning, granted
to [all other federal] Judges . . ., and the President shall be authorized
to appoint a successor to any such Justice of the Supreme Court so
retiring from regular active service on the bench, but such Justice . .
. so retired may nevertheless be . . . authorized to perform such
judicial duties, in any judicial circuit . . . as such retired Justice may
be willing to undertake.157

House Bill 2518, his Retirement Bill, and House Bill 2660, his
Intervention Bill, were a package from his perspective, but his
hometown paper noticed solely House Bill 2518. On January 18th,
the Dallas Morning News reported House Bill 2518’s filing and
observed that “six of the nine present members would be eligible
immediately” to retire and receive the bill’s benefits.158
Only when Sumners informed its reporter following the
President’s announcement did the Dallas newspaper tie House Bills
2518 and 2260 together. Referring of course to his two bills, the
Congressman “pointed out that two remedies suggested by the
153. Cummings to HWS, Feb. 4, 1935, reprinted in PAPERS OF HOMER
CUMMINGS, supra note 88. Glock has a slightly different account of the events,
with the Justice Department drafting the bill and a supporting memorandum
dated Jan. 29, 1935 and Sumners picking them up there. Glock, Unpacking,
supra note 18, at 59.
154. S. REP. NO. 119 at 1 (Feb. 23, 1937).
155. H.R. 7911, 74th Cong. (1935).
156. 79 CONG. REC. 3057-60 (Mar. 6, 1935).
157. H.R. 2518, 75th Cong. (1937).
158. High Court Judges Eligible to Retire by Sumners Bill, DALL. MORNING
NEWS, Jan. 18, 1937, at 1.
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President are embraced in part in bills which have passed his
committee for favorable action.”159 The article reviewed the
Retirement Bill again and then described House Bill 2260 as
proposing to accord standing to the Attorney General with the right
to intervene “and have all the rights of other litigants in the suit”
when an issue of a statute’s constitutionality is drawn.160 Roosevelt
and his inner circle regarded Sumners’s House Bill 2518 as
complementary with the court-packing plan.161 As it played out, the
even-lower profile bill, House Bill 2260, was also necessary to
resolve the New Deal’s litigation problem completely.
The rest of January, the start of the first session of the 75th
Congress, was a busy time for Sumners, filing other bills and
performing constituent services such on January 11th presenting a
prominent young Dallas judge, Sarah T. Hughes, for swearing in to
the Supreme Court’s bar.162 January 20th saw the inauguration of
Roosevelt in cold, wet weather, the first time that, thanks to the
Lame Duck Amendment, a president had been sworn in so early.163
The address by the President contained only obscure references to
the New Deal’s litigation problem.164 On February 2nd, Sumners
and Ashurst joined most of the justices and ninety guests in a gala
dinner the President hosted in the White House’s East Room. At
that point, the President decided to launch his proposal three days
later, on Friday, February 5th, because the Court was scheduled for
arguments the next Monday in a case challenging the
constitutionality of the Wagner Act.165
Roosevelt’s team wished to have the court-packing plan
introduced as a bill in the House, but Sumners maneuvered for the
bill to be filed in the Senate so the hearings on it would be conducted
in that chambers’ Judiciary Committee, preserving freedom of
action for himself. He quickly signaled that, as chair of the House
Judiciary Committee, he might slice the bill into its constituent
elements and otherwise take his time. According to Congressman
(later Chief Justice) Fred Vinson, Sumners never even mentioned
the packing plan in his committee throughout the crisis period.166
159. Part of President’s Court Move Embraced in Pending House Bills, DALL.
MORNING NEWS, Feb. 6, 1937, at 1.
160. Id.
161. Glock, Unpacking, supra note 18, at 60.
162. Local Judge Guest at White House, DALL. MORNING NEWS at 5 (Jan. 13,
1937); see DARWIN PAYNE, INDOMITABLE SARAH: THE LIFE OF JUDGE SARAH T.
HUGHES at 103 (2004). The first woman to serve as a Texas state judge and the
second woman as a federal district judge, Hughes is additionally remembered
for swearing in Lyndon B. Johnson as President aboard Air Force One shortly
after the assassination of John F. Kennedy.
163. U.S. CONST. amend. XX.
164. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address, Jan. 20, 1937 (saying, e.g.,
“If I know aught of the spirit and purpose of our Nation, we will not listen to
comfort, opportunism, and timidity. We will carry on.”).
165. Leuchtenburg, supra note 114, at 399.
166. Memorandum from Cummings to FDR, Memo of interview with Rep.
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Garner advised the President to have the bill introduced in the
Senate, whose Majority Leader, Joseph Robinson of Arkansas,
pledged to obtain passage. It is widely believed that Senator
Robinson hoped his reward would be an appointment to the
Supreme Court. Ashurst introduced the plan as Senate Bill 1392 on
February 8th.167
On February 11th, the Dallas Morning News observed that the
Retirement Bill “might easily be the means of solving the Supreme
Court issue entirely” and reported that “[e]arly in the day Sumners
was called to the executive mansion, where he conferred with
President Roosevelt over judicial program and returned to the
Capitol announcing that the President had no objections to
consideration of both [of Sumners’s] bills.” Yet as soon as the House
had passed House Bill 2518, “word reached Sumners from the White
House that further study of [the standing and intervention bill,
House Bill 2260] was wanted by the [A]ttorney General.”168 So
House Bill 2260 stalled while, two weeks later, the Senate by a 764 vote approved House Bill 2518; and on March 1, 1937, just twentyfour days after the announcement of the court-packing plan, the
President signed the Retirement Act into law.169 Two months later,
on April 9th, the House did approve the Intervention Bill, and the
Senate referred House Bill 2260 to its Judiciary Committee,170
where it would remain pending until the final days of the resolution
of the crisis.
Although he immediately signed Sumners’s Retirement Bill,
the President did not abandon or alter his plan to pack the Court
but threw himself deeply into the fight. In a radio “fireside chat”
broadcast on March 9th, FDR took his argument to the people,
insisting that the nation was in a crisis — “one-third of a Nation illnourished, ill-clad, ill-housed” — that required such action and
conceding that his real intention was indeed to populate the
Supreme Court with justices who would view the New Deal
programs favorably.171 His poll numbers temporarily rose172, but
then fell back, and the controversy raged on through March.173
Despite the intensity of the issue, the court-packing plan was
Fred Vinson (July 26, 1937), FDR Library.
167. S. 1392, 75th Cong. (Feb. 8, 1937).
168. House Passes Bill to Permit Judges to Quit, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Feb.
11, 1937, at 1.
169. 50 Stat. 24.
170. 81 CONG. REC. 3306-13 (Apr. 9, 1937).
171. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat 9: On ”Court-Packing”
(Mar.
9,
1937),
www.millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidentialspeeches/march-9-1937-fireside-chat-9-court-packing [perma.cc/D8XP-RKPG].
172. Caldeira, Public Opinion, supra note 129, at 1142.
173. Franklyn Waltman, 2 Polls Indicate Popularity Loss For Roosevelt,
WASH. POST, May 24, 1937, at 1.
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not the only significant public-policy question of 1937. Roosevelt
had a bill introduced to reorganize the executive branch, and
various members of Congress sponsored bills regarding the nation’s
neutrality.174 Sumners remained busy filing and moving legislation
to enactment. He introduced sixty-two bills during the 75th
Congress, ten of which were signed into law, about his average
through the Roosevelt years.175 Most of his enactments were
amendments of federal criminal law including the crime of bank
robbery,176 execution of federal courts’ death sentences by contract
with states,177 penalties for narcotics’ convictions,178 and grand jury
procedure.179 His other legislation was a tiny step toward judicial
efficiency180 and a bill that benefitted Dallas tourism.181
After the March 1st signing of the Retirement Act, with his
Intervention Bill pending in the Senate and Roosevelt continuing to
promote the court-packing plan, the Congressman had “to keep my
own counsel for the present” as “both sides are more or less
angry.”182 Because he chaired the House Judiciary Committee,
Sumners received a heavy volume of correspondence from people all
over the nation. Letters in the Sumners’s archive opposed the plan
by about 20-to-1.183 Many correspondents expressed the view that
the Court should remain at nine members because that is what they
believed the Constitution explicitly requires or because that is the
way the Court always has been staffed, neither of which is correct,
of course.184 Sumners did not reply to the out-of-staters but
scrupulously answered his Dallas constituents.
Responding in late February to criticism from the prominent
174. Turner Catledge, Reorganization Plans Leave Congress Dazed, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan 17, 1937, at 65.
175. A search was performed in the ProQuest Congressional online research
service with a query of Sumners’s name and requesting the bills he sponsored
during the 75th Congress. A copy of this report is in the possession of the author
and the UIC John Marshall Law Review.
176. H.R. 5900, 75 P.L. 349, 50 Stat. 749 (1937).
177. H.R. 2705, 75 P.L. 156, 50 Stat. 304 (1937).
178. H.R. 6283, 75 P.L. 267, 50 Stat. 627 (1937).
179. H.R. 2702, 75 P.L. 348, 50 Stat. 748 (1937).
180. H.R. 2703, 75 P.L. 179, 50 Stat. 473 (1937) (concerning the senior circuit
judges’ annual conference).
181. H. J. RES. 221 (tariff exemption on goods imported for exhibition at the
Greater Texas and Pan-American Exposition, a follow-on to the 1936 Texas
Centennial Exposition); KENNETH B. RAGSDALE, CENTENNIAL ’36: THE YEAR
AMERICA DISCOVERED TEXAS 305 (1987).
182. HWS to P.D. Jackson, Pres. of Dallas Central Labor Council, Mar. 4,
1937, and HWS to Wm. Andress, Jr., Mar. 5, 1937, Sumners Papers.
183. Champagne, Sumners and the Court-Packing Plan, supra note 51, at
48, 49 n. 10 (“Sumners was bombarded with [an] enormous number of letters
and telegrams” opposing the plan).
184. “The bitter fight that led to the defeat of [FDR’s] “Court-packing” plan
. . . has given the notion of a nine-person Court such sanctity that it is unlikely
that the size will ever be changed.” 13 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FED. PRAC.
& PROC., Jurisdiction § 3507 (3d ed.).
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Baptist leader J.B. Cranfill of Dallas that the Retirement Bill was
simply “sugaring the old justices” and “bribing the old boys to get
off the job,” Sumners wrote:
Most people that I know . . . are opposed to increasing the Federal
[Supreme] Court to fifteen members . . . [and] know that these Judges
must come off the bench, as I say, within a year, [and] regard it as
good, common, practical sense to make it possible for these men to
retire voluntarily when they want to do so . . . . [I]f some of them would
retire now it would relieve the pressure which is to be brought to bear
on this proposal for fifteen Supreme Court judgeships.185

To constituents with whom he was not particularly close, the
Congressman spoke in broad generalities of the pressure and
difficulties of his undertaking.186 To confidants, such as a theatre
manager on March 5th, he was quite explicit:
I know exactly what I am trying to do; I know how I am trying to do
it. . . . I am not holding anything in reserve, but am putting everything
I have into the effort to work the problem out. The situation is
somewhat like a fisherman who is trying to land a big fish in difficult
water – I do not believe that anybody on the bank can tell him very
well what to do. . . . I have got to do this thing myself and stand
responsible for the results.187

Three days later, to a Dallas attorney and statewide bar leader, he
expressed confidence that his Retirement Act would accomplish the
desired result: “[w]hether I can do the thing I am trying to do or not,
it seems to be the consensus of opinion here that I am the only
person who has a chance to do it.”188
And in fact, Sumners had to wait but two months to see that
“the thing” he was “trying to do” was in fact working to resolve the
crisis, although some intermediate steps helpfully occurred sooner.
185. J.B. Cranfill to HWS, Feb. 23, 1937 and HWS to J.B. Cranfill, Feb. 26,
1937 (emphasis added), Sumners Papers.
186. For instance, in a March 18 letter, Sumners replied to Harold C. Weil
of Dallas: “I fully appreciate the importance of this matter and you may be
assured that the [House Judiciary] Committee will give it the consideration
which that importance requires.” To W.T. White, a high school principal: “I am
working under very great pressure now.” And to Robert Hincks, a prominent
Dallas lawyer, on March 19: “I am doing my best to be useful in this very difficult
and delicate situation.” HWS to (i) Harold C. Weil, Mar. 18, 1937; (ii) HWS to
W.T. White, Mar. 15, 1937; and (iii) HWS to Robert Hincks, Mar. 19, 1937; all
three in the Sumners Papers.
187. HWS to Paul P. Scott, Mar. 5, 1937, Sumners Papers.
188. HWS to D.A. Frank, Mar. 8, 1937, Sumners Papers. To another Dallas
attorney, he also expressed self-confidence: “[S]o far as I can see now there has
been no mistake made, either in the strategy or the execution. . . . The entire
nation seems to appreciate what I am trying to do . . . and the only reason I have
gotten in it this time is because everyone seems to feel that no one else, at least
under the circumstances, had a chance to do the job.” WRS to W.D. Jones, Feb.
26, 1937, Sumners Papers.
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On March 22nd, Sumners sent a reassuring missive to Chief Justice
Hughes urging calm and patience,189 and on the same day Hughes,
joined by Justices Brandeis and Van Devanter, sent a letter to
Senator Burton K. Wheeler, a member of the Senate’s Judiciary
Committee, reporting that the Court was not behind in its docket
and that increasing the number of justices would actually impair its
work.190
Then, on March 27th, the Supreme Court took a juristic turn,
as described by Bernard Schwartz:
A remarkable reversal in the Supreme Court’s attitude toward the
New Deal program took place early in 1937. . . . It is too facile to state
that the 1937 change was merely a protective response to the Courtpacking plan, to assert, as did so many contemporary wags, that “a
switch in time saved Nine.” . . . The 1937 reversal reflected changes
in legal ideology common to the entire legal profession. The extreme
individualistic philosophy upon which the Justices had been nurtured
had been shaken to its foundations. If laissez-faire jurisprudence gave
way to judicial pragmatism, it simply reflected a similar movement
that had taken place in the country as a whole.191

On March 29th, with Roberts now voting in a majority and the Four
Horsemen dissenting, the Supreme Court issued its decision in West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,192 upholding a state’s minimum wage
law, in effect overruling the only nine-month-old Tipaldo decision.
Next, on April 12th in multiple cases of which NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp.193 is the landmark, the Court, again by a 54 vote, upheld the Wagner Act. Those decisions “formed the heart of
the constitutional revolution of 1937.”194 Newspapers touted the
decisions as removing any cause for packing the Court, and over
Roosevelt’s subsequent, lengthy tenure as President, the Court
never again invalidated any New Deal legislation. From FDR’s
perspective, however, those decisions, while welcome, did not
provide adequate assurance. Their 5-4 majorities depended on
Justice Roberts, who had shown himself flexible in 1935 and 1936,
189. HWS to Charles Evans Hughes, Mar. 22, 1937, Sumners Papers.
190. William E. Leuchtenburg, The Nine Justices Respond to the 1937 Crisis,
1997 J. SUP. CT. Hist. 55, 63-64 (1997); Richard D. Friedman, Chief Justice
Hughes' Letter on Court-Packing, 1997 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 76, 79-82 (1997). The
letter is an exhibit to the Senate Judiciary Report, S. REP. NO. 711.
191. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 234 (1993);
John Q. Barrett, Attribution Time: Cal Tinney’s 1937 Quip, “A Switch in Time’ll
Save Nine,” 73 OKLA. L. REV. 229, 238 (2021),
192. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
193. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
194. SCHWARTZ, supra note 191, at 237. William G. Ross explains: “The
Court’s abandonment of substantive due process and reinterpretation of
congressional powers during the spring of 1937 was so sudden, so sweeping, and
so permanent that its decision has come to be known as ‘the judicial revolution
of 1937.’” Ross, Hughes Court, supra note 113, at 238. Numerous authorities
have found that Roberts had voted in these cases before learning of the courtpacking plan.
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so FDR continued to press his plan, and the Senate Judiciary
Committee held many rounds of hearings.
Meanwhile, the spring of 1937 continued to be a busy time for
Sumners as legislator. On the date of the Parrish decision, he filed
House Bill 5969, his bill to reenact the Municipal Bankruptcy Act
that the Court had declared unconstitutional in Ashton ten months
earlier.195 Taking cues from Justice Cardozo’s extended dissent in
that case, Sumners slightly revised and refiled the original act
because the public need that inspired it persisted.196 However, other
aspects of Sumners’s legislative efforts during this time have drawn
condemnation, from then to today, as he continued to use his
acumen and skills to oppose efforts to make lynching a federal
crime. Participation in forging the New Deal had not undone his
determination to ensure white supremacy.
On the same day in early January that Sumners had filed his
Intervention Bill, Arthur Wergs Mitchell, the African American
Congressman from Chicago, had introduced an anti-lynching bill,
House Bill 2251, following by a few days House Bill 1507 by
Representative Joseph A. Gavagan of New York.197 Both were
similar to the Dyer Bill of the 1920s, but Gavagan’s was stronger. A
total of about fifty additional bills on the topic were referred to the
Judiciary Committee, but Sumners refused to let any of them out.
When Gavagan and his supporters obtained a discharge petition to
push his bill to a House vote, Sumners or his committee allies tried
to outmaneuver them by procuring Mitchell’s amendment of his bill,
neutering an evidentiary presumption it contained to aid
prosecution of the offense and rendering the bill, from the
perspective of the NAACP, “utterly worthless,”198 and then sending
the Mitchell Bill to the full House before the Gavagan Bill could be
heard.
195. H.R. 5969, 75 P.L. 302, 50 Stat. 653 (1937).
196. In the Bekins case, see note 246 infra, the Supreme Court observed:
“the statute is carefully drawn so as not to impinge on the sovereignty of the
State.” Bekins v. U.S., 304 U.S. 27, 51 (1938). A commentator has remarked: “A
comparison of [the First and Second Municipal Bankruptcy Acts] leads one to
wonder what statutory differences were constitutionally significant. Perhaps
there were none.” KENNETH N. KLEE, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT
152 (2008).
197. H.R. 2251 (by Mitchell); H.R. 1505 (by Gavagan).
198. Walter White (Secretary, NAACP) to J.C. Austin, Apr. 3, 1939, NAACP
Papers, Library of Congress (decrying the opposition of “Hatton Sumners of
Texas and other bitter opponents of any anti-lynching legislation”); TM to J.T.
Rosea, Apr. 2, 1939 (“Congressman Hatton Sumners . . . is at present making
this argument that lynching can be stopped by the States and it is not necessary
to have a Federal bill”); Walter White to Max Stern, Apr. 5, 1937, NAACP
Papers (“every trick possible is being pulled out of the bag by Hatton Sumners
. . . in trying to block passage of the anti-lynching bill”), all in Papers of the
NAACP.
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On April 8, the committee’s majority recommended the
amended Mitchell Bill, but Sumners protested, reprising his statesrights arguments, even though Mitchell had defanged his bill at the
instigation of Sumners or others of his committee. Later that day,
Sumners did vote “aye” on the procedural question of putting the
Mitchell Bill to a vote of the full House, as he apparently had
promised Mitchell he would do, but by a 257-123 vote the House
declined to take up House Bill 2251,199 defeating the Mitchell bill.
When the Gavagan Bill came before the House on April 15th,
Sumners denounced it, repeating the racial aspersions of his
infamous 1922 diatribe including the allegation of African American
men attacking white women and the assertion that lynching was
thus justified.200 Sumners praised Mitchell, who deigned to stand
beside him in the well of the House, but the Gavagan Bill easily
passed the House that date, only to die late in the year in a Senate
filibuster led by another Texan, Senator Tom Connally. FDR did
nothing to support the cause of anti-lynching in 1937, although
First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt did.201
The following month, the event Sumners had been expecting
since March 1st happened. On May 18th, Justice Van Devanter
announced he would retire on June 2nd. He wrote the President
that “I desire to avail myself of all the rights, privileges and judicial
service specified in the [Retirement] Act of March 1, 1937.”202 He
sent a copy to Sumners, who wrote back, “You have done a most
courageous thing under the circumstances, a patriotic thing.”203
That development “sent the enemies of the Supreme Court into a
tailspin”204 and of course enabled appointment of a successor loyal
to FDR, Senator Hugo Black of Alabama, assuring that a majority
on the Court would continue safely favorable to the New Deal.

199. 81 CONG. REC. 3352-53 (Apr. 15, 1937).
200. Id. at 3534. Sumners averred “a [recent] case to illustrate what I am
talking about,” a lynching in Texas of an African American for the alleged
murder of “a 14-year-old girl at home. . . . weltering in her own blood,” the
alleged perpetrator soon located “on the railroad tracks, about 3 miles away”
with blood on his clothes, which for Sumners justified the man’s immediate,
extrajudicial execution. He concluded by arguing that the rate of lynchings had
been falling. In the Sumners Papers is his hand-made bar chart, using statistics
provided to him by Tuskegee Institute. A copy of this bar chart is in the
possession of the author and the UIC John Marshall Law Review.
201. Peter Irons, Politics and Principle: An Assessment of the Roosevelt
Record on Civil Rights and Liberties, 59 WASH. L. REV. 693 (1984) (“Roosevelt
did little to advance the cause of civil rights and liberties during his twelve years
in the White House”); see also DAVID MICHAELIS, ELEANOR 323-26 (2020);
Michael E. Parrish, The Great Depression, The New Deal, and the American
Legal Order, 59 WASH. L. REV. 723 (1984); David M. Bixby, The Roosevelt Court,
Democratic Ideology, and Minority Rights: Another Look at United States v.
Classic, 90 YALE L.J. 741 (1981).
202. Glock, Unpacking, supra note 18, at 33-34.
203. Id.
204. Caldeira, Public Opinion, supra note 129, at 1148.
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Additional developments confirmed the doom of the packing
plan. The Court issued two more decisions on May 24th upholding
key New Deal enactments, the old-age-and-survivor-benefits and
the unemployment-compensation components of the Social Security
Act.205 And on June 14th, an 11-7 bipartisan majority of the Senate
Judiciary Committee released its adverse report, authored by a
senator who originally had been supportive, Patrick A. McCarran of
Nevada.206 The report was unrestrained in its criticism, denouncing
“the futility and absurdity of the devious” and characterizing the
proposal as an attempt “to punish the Justices” and “an invasion of
judicial power such as has never before been attempted in this
country.”207
According to Glock, the President’s continued insistence that
the plan be approved by the Senate despite his having already
achieved his goal “caused Hatton Sumners and many Democrats to
publicly break with their leader.”208 As Sumners later told a
constituent, “I realized that . . . the court was going too far in the
field where governmental policy is fixed,” which was why he worked
for and obtained passage of his two judicial bills, but he “never said
a word about the . . . ‘President’s Bill’ until after new blood began to
flow into the court.”209 On July 13th, the 159th day of the crisis,
Sumners made a speech that Congressman Samuel B. Pettengill of
Indiana credited “as important a single contribution to the defeat of
the bill as any that was made.”210 In it, Sumners took credit for his
Retirement Act having already resolved the crisis:
We gave these judges the same right to retire previously given other
judges. Was not that the thing to do? . . . . It was your bill; you passed
it. . . . The Senate passed it. The President signed it. And
notwithstanding the difficulties that were brought about by the great
disturbance, one of these judges quit the bench under the provisions
of that law. The President can fill that vacancy when he chooses. . . .
That created a condition with regard to that Court which makes it
205. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548 (1937).
206. JEROME E. EDWARDS, PAT MCCARRAN: POLITICAL BOSS OF NEVADA 7778 (1982).
207. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY, S. REP. NO. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 at 10, 11, 13 & 23 (1937).
208. Glock, Unpacking, supra note 18, at 34.
209. HWS to J.S. Durham, Apr. 18, 1938, Sumners Papers.
210. Samuel B. Pettengill, The Supreme Court Fight in the House of
Representatives, THE TOCSIN, Feb. 1938, at 3, (accompanying note from Samuel
Pettengill to Joseph C. O’Mahoney, Joseph C. O’Mahoney Papers, University of
Wyoming). In general, contemporary observers gave more credit to Sumners’s
speech than have scholars of the past half century. For example, an August 1937
article stated that “In the opinion of many, Chairman Sumners’s stirring speech
in the House dealt the ill-fated ‘compromise’ its death-blow.” Sylvester C. Smith,
Jr., Public Opinion Defeated the Court Bill, 23 ABA J. 575, 576 (Aug. 1937).
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possible to change the relationship as much as adding two new judges
would. There was no controversy, no noise. . . . [We have done it] with
a surgical instrument, not a meat ax.211

The Justice to whom Sumners referred was, of course, Willis van
Devanter. Summers’s implication was that, if the Senate did send
the bill to the House, he would bottle it up in his committee.212
That night Robinson died. According to Whitehurst:
Senator Robinson, who had worn himself out leading the Senate
proponents, and had hoped for the reward of a seat on the Supreme
Court, was found dead of a heart attack in his apartment, with a copy
of the Congressional Record in his hand. The fight to “pack” the
Supreme Court was over. . . . F.D.R. would not speak to [Sumners].213

Nine days later, July 22nd, the 168th day as counted by Alsop
and Catledge, Senate Bill 1392 officially died when the full Senate
by the overwhelming, bipartisan vote of 70-20, recommitted it.214
Virtually alone among scholars, Glock credits Sumners’s
Retirement Act with having “sabotage[d] the enactment of
Roosevelt’s court-packing plan.”215
After April and May, there was no reason to try to pack the
Court; the New Deal’s litigation problem was solved to a significant
degree; and the President’s plan was effectively dead.216 Yet the
controversy dragged on. If events of March 29th through May 24th,
including Van Devanter’s utilization of the Retirement Act and the
“constitutional revolution of 1937” were the climax of the courtpacking crisis, the denouement required another three months,
June through August, to play out. In May, the Dallas Morning
News, noting that Sumners “has been intimate with the court
situation” since February 5th, quoted him: “I am not done yet.”217

b. August 24, 1937: The Intervention Act
After the Senate Judiciary Committee’s harsh report of June
14th, Garner unexpectedly decamped for a long vacation in Texas,
but the President nonetheless forged ahead by launching a “charm
offensive,” entertaining all the Democrats in Congress at the
Jefferson Islands Club in Chesapeake Bay the weekend of June
211. 81 CONG. REC., 7143 (July 13, 1937).
212. Committee to Reject Court Change, House Warned by Sumners, N.Y.
TIMES, July 14, 1937, at 1.
213. Whitehurst, Sumners, supra note 21, at 7. His implication is that
Robinson read Sumners’s speech just before the heart attack.
214. 81 CONG. REC. 7381 (July 22, 1937).
215. Glock, Unpacking, supra note 18, at 36.
216. “Roosevelt could have declared victory and departed from the
battlefield with head held high.” Joseph L. Rauh Jr., A Personalized View of the
Court-Packing Episode, 1990 J. SUP. CT. Hist. 93, 97 (1990).
217. Sumners Had Part in Retirement of Associate Justice, DALL. MORNING
NEWS, May 19, 1937, at 5.
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25th.218 Roosevelt proffered a compromise, limiting the addition of
justices to one per year but retaining the ultimate cap of fifteen.
With debate opening on the Senate floor, the original sponsor
Ashurst and two of his committee members filed a proposed
substitute bill under the same number that included the oneadditional-justice-per-year limit, and they also incorporated the
text of Sumners’s pending House Bill 2660. The proposed substitute
bill was quickly tabled, and Senator Joseph O’Mahoney then filed
on July 6th a very short amendment of Ashurst’s bill, simply
inserting the one-per-year limit, which McCarran replaced two days
later with a better drafted but still terse amendment.219 Under all
of the proposed amendments, the original provisions in Senate Bill
1392 remained intact, including for more justices, fifty more federal
lower-court judgeships, and a litigation proctor.
Working extremely hard, Majority Leader Robinson reportedly
rounded up sufficient commitments, and with Washington weather
turning brutally hot, he put the Senate on a grueling schedule of
proceedings to dispose the scores of pending obstacles to Ashurst’s
bill, to wear down the opponents, and to pass the bill. With
Robinson’s death on July 13th,220 any thread of hope for the plan
snapped, and Sumners’s pending Intervention Bill suddenly became
highly relevant. Just then Garner returned from Texas and stepped
in to negotiate a settlement with Senator William Borah, the leader
of the Republican Senators, who insisted that Senate Bill 1392 be
buried.
Garner and Senate Democrats in favor of the plan had to
concede. The Senate voted 70-20 on July 22nd to recommit the bill.
The motion by Senator M. M. Logan of Kentucky, however, carried
an implicit understanding that the Judiciary Committee would go
to work and report a bill for some type of reform of the judiciary —
and quickly.221 To confirm that understanding, Senator Warren
Austin of Vermont moved to amend the recommittal motion to
require that the committee report a new bill, not on the topic
“reform of the judiciary” but rather on “reform of judicial
procedure,” and Logan was compelled to admit that in the
forthcoming work of the Committee, “the Supreme Court is out of
the way.”222
At this point, a shaken Ashurst rose and promised that his

218. NANCY PETERSON HILL, A VERY PRIVATE PUBLIC CITIZEN: THE LIFE OF
GRENVILLE CLARK 116 (2014); William E. Leuchtenburg, FDR’s Court-Packing
Plan: A Second Life, A Second Death, 1985 DUKE L.J. 673, 675-76 (1985).
219. Nonetheless, McCarran rose on July 10th to again denounce the plan.
81 CONG. REC. 7018-7027 (July 10, 1937).
220. SHESOL, SUPREME POWER, supra note 2, at 497-500.
221. 81 CONG. REC. 7375 (July 22, 1937).
222. 81 CONG. REC. 7381 (July 22, 1937).
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committee would, “with zeal and fidelity, bring in within 10 days
such a bill as the Senate desires.”223 He set a committee meeting for
the next day224 but it fell to McCarran, a former justice of the
Nevada Supreme Court who had been informally taking the lead on
the committee since May, to seize the initiative. He and the Senate
Judiciary Committee members refocused on Sumners’s longpending House Bill 2260, the bill to grant the Attorney General the
right of intervention and standing to appeal in all constitutionality
cases. Substantially all accounts of the crisis have misreported that,
after recommittal of Ashurst’s bill, Congress then passed a “watered
down” substitute of Senate Bill 1392 or that the objected-to features
were “deleted” from a bill embodying the packing plan and then
passed.225 However, it was not the President’s bill, S.B. 1392, or any
version of the court-packing plan, but rather Sumners’s
Intervention Bill that then moved forward.
House Bill 2260 offered, if not the only, then certainly the
easiest and quickest, route to accomplish something for the
President that had a demonstrable relationship to the litigation
problem that had motivated the packing plan, as well as to
demarcate a clear termination of the crisis. McCarran embellished
the bill’s intervention provision, without altering its substance, by
repeatedly adding the word “party” to the Sumners’s provision for
the Attorney General to intervene in lower-court proceedings. Then
the Senator added two substantive sections. The first was for
reassignment of cases in the event of the disability of senior judges,
enlarging a provision in the existing law that Sumners had obtained
three years earlier for senior circuit judges.226 The second and more
important was a requirement copied from existing Judicial Code
sections applicable to the Interstate Commerce Commission and
issues of validity of state statutes for a panel of two district judges
and one Court of Appeals judge to determine any request in an
action for an injunction against a federal official.227 This was a
deficiency of Ashurst’s Senate Bill 1392 that McCarran had pointed
out in the Senate Judiciary Committee’s adverse report of June
14th.228

223. Id.
224. 81 CONG. REC. 7381-82 (July 22, 1937).
225. See, e.g., Introduction to the “Court Plan,” PAPERS OF HOMER
CUMMINGS, supra note 88, at 170 (“The essence of the President's proposal for
judicial reform was deleted from the measure which finally passed the Congress
in mid-August of 1937); House Passes New Court Bill In Dull Style, WASH. POST,
Aug. 12, 1937, at 7 (the “measure stripped of its authorization to appoint [more]
justice[s] . . . now goes to the White House”); Patenaude, Garner, Sumners, and
Connally, supra note 131, at 50 (“a watered-down bill”).
226. H.R. 7356, 73d Cong. (1934), P.L. 73-249, 48 Stat. 796.
227. David P. Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional
Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (1964) [hereinafter, Currie, Three-Judge
District Court”].
228. S. REP. NO. 799 (1937) at 3.
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In fact, it had been McCarran who, shortly after the
announcement of the court-packing plan, quickly obtained Senate
approval for a definitive survey of “the issuance of extraordinary
writs by Federal courts and of judgments . . . in all amounting to
several thousands within the past three years.” The resolution
requested the principal departments and agencies of the executive
branch of the government to report to the Senate “all cases in which
injunctions, restraining orders, or other judgments” had been issued
“enjoining, suspending, or restraining the enforcement, operation,
or execution of any Act of Congress, or any provision thereof,
administered by such department or agency” together with a brief
statement of “the extent to which, and the manner in which, the
operations of the Government have been affected.”229
Submitting his report on March 25th on behalf of the Justice
and Treasury Departments as Senate Document No. 42, Attorney
General Cummings had advised that 1,898 cases contesting the
constitutionality of the AAA had been filed in federal district courts,
and that “courts allowed injunctions or restraining orders in some
1,600 cases, denied injunctions in 166 cases and withheld decisions
in 132 cases. In addition, 128 injunctions had been entered against
the Coal Act, more than one hundred against the various parts of
the NIRA, twenty-eight against the Public Utility Holding Company
Act, and scores against various new taxes.230 Fifteen other agencies
reported significant numbers of adverse injunctions that had
impaired their ability to administer the programs and enforce their
respective duties under the challenged New Deal statutes.231
Congress did respond in some instances to the Court’s
unconstitutionality rulings of 1935 and 1936 by enacting redesigned
programs.232 For example, the Connally Hot Oil Act of 1935 omitted
the offending provision that the Panama Refining Court had
identified in the NIRA, and as noted, Sumners filed and obtained
quick passage of a slightly tweaked Municipal Bankruptcy Act to
overcome Ashton. However, the ability and propensity of the sitting
trial court judges, seventy-eight percent of whom remained preRoosevelt appointees at the end of his first term,233 to grant
injunctions against the New Deal persisted. So, McCarran’s
addition to Sumners’s bill of the three-judge injunctive provision
addressed another facet of the New Deal’s litigation problem that

229. S. RES. 82 § (1)-(2) (Feb. 17, 1937).
230. Reports of Justice and Treasury Departments on Injunctions in Cases
Involving Acts of Congress, S. DOC. 42 (Mar. 25, 1937).
231. For a dissection of Cummings’ and the other agencies’ reports of specific
harms the wave of injunctions caused the government, see Barry Cushman, The
Judicial Reforms of 1937, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 999-1020 (2020).
232. Id. at 1021-23.
233. Id. at 1024
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House Bill 2260 had not covered.
On August 7th McCarran called up the amended House Bill
2260 in the Senate, advising that its amendments were made by
him and his committee expressly “to carry out the instruction of the
Senate of July 22 . . . when S.1392 . . . was recommitted.”234 The
Congressional Record contains Senator Austin’s and others’
extended citations of reported case law on concepts of “case,”
“controversy” and “party,” seeking to explain why McCarran had
revised the provisions of Sumners’s bill for the Attorney General not
only to “have the same rights as a party to the extent necessary for
a proper presentation of the facts and law,” as Sumners had drafted
it, but indubitably to “become a party.”235 The Senate approved
McCarran’s amendments to Sumners’s Intervention Bill and
“Garner gaveled that bill through the Senate so fast that there were
many protests,”236 sending the amended bill back to the House on
August 7th.
The House disagreed on August 9th, necessitating a conference
committee whose members included Sumners and McCarran, but
not Ashurst, and resulting in further wordsmithing of the bill. The
next day, August 10th, the Senate approved the conference version
of House Bill 2260.237 With Senate approval reported to the House
early on August 11th, Sumners then took the lead on the House
floor, explaining that the conferees had agreed to delete any
requirement for the lower court to find either that “a substantial
question exists” as to constitutionality or that “the government has
an actual or probable legal interest,” and substituted the test of
“constitutionality [being] drawn in question.”238 When Sumners
paused for questions, Congressman Kent E. Keller, noticing the
change in wording, asked whether it made intervention by the
Justice Department mandatory, and Sumners replied that
intervention would be discretionary, that the Government “may
have itself made a party [but] it cannot be [involuntarily] drawn
in.”239 The Speaker declared the further amended bill passed.240
In conference, Sumners had agreed to one more change. The
amended Sumners bill, House Bill 2260, now carried the title
“Reform of Judicial Procedure,” as Senator Austin had wanted,
despite it being Sumners’s bill and although, even as amended by
the Senate and further revised in conference, it provided not one
more federal judge and no proctor which had been central parts of

234. S. REP. NO. 963 (1937).
235. H.R. 2260 as amended by S. REP. NO. 996, July 28, 1973; 81 CONG. REC.
8507-11.
236. MICHAEL JOHN ROMANO, THE EMERGENCE OF JOHN NANCE GARNER AS
A FIGURE IN NATIONAL POLITICS 265 (1990); 81 CONG. REC.8515 (Aug. 7, 1937).
237. 81 CONG. REC. 8609-8610 (Aug. 10, 1937).
238. Reform of Judicial Procedure, H.R. REP. NO. 1490, Aug. 10, 1937, at 5.
239. 81 CONG. REC. 8704 (Aug. 11, 1937).
240. 81 CONG. REC. 8705 (Aug. 11, 1937).

2021]

The Instrumental Role of Congressman Hatton Sumners

419

the President’s plan.241 The bill went to the President.
Sumners issued his own fifteen paragraph report of its passage
and an explanation of its five sections, and he placed that as a letter
to the editor in the pages of the August 15th issue of the New York
Times, presenting it as a fait accompli.242 Cummings begrudgingly
approved it, opining to Roosevelt that “[m]easured against [the
packing plan], it is but a meager performance [but] presents
meritorious provisions of a minor character.”243 On August 23, a
White House press release called the bill acceptable, and the next
day the President signed the Intervention Act244 along with other
bills, including two of Sumners’s amendments to the Criminal Code.
The Intervention Act of August 24, 1937, is Sumners’s other
bookend to the court-packing crisis, and it is of much greater
significance than Cummings acknowledged. One salient example of
this act’s immediate efficacy suffices: the litigation of the
constitutionality of Sumners’s Second Municipal Bankruptcy Act in
the first case filed under it soon after its re-enactment. The district
judge notified the Justice Department on October 11th that an
objecting bondholder had raised the constitutionality issue, and the
government intervened for the first time under the Act.245 When
that court, citing Ashton, held the statute unconstitutional, the
Justice Department appealed to the Supreme Court. Sumners
received the Chief Justice’s leave to file an amicus brief and to make
the lead oral argument on April 7, 1938, and the government won
the constitutionality issue in the decision of U.S. v. Bekins by a 6-2
vote two weeks later.246

241. The sole exception is that McCarran grossly watered down the
provision of S. 1392 that would have authorized the Chief Justice of the United
States to delegate district judges to handle cases in other districts for efficiency;
as he inserted it into Sumners’s bill, the provision was solely to direct federal
judges to fill in for disabled judges in other jurisdictions.
242. HWS, More Dignified Legislation Seen Under New Court Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug 15, 1937, at 8E.
243. Cummings to FDR, Aug. 17, 1937, reprinted in PAPERS OF HOMER
CUMMINGS, supra note 88, at 173.
244. H.R. 2260; P.L. 352, 50 Stat. 751 (Aug. 24, 2021).
245. “This is the first case in which the United States intervened in private
litigation to support the constitutionality of an act of Congress under the
provisions of the act of August 24, 1937.” Report of Assistant Attorney General
Sam E. Whitaker, in Charge of the Claims Division, 1937 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP.
107, 119 (1937-1938).
246. 304 U.S. 27 (1938).
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V.SUMNERS’S KEY ROLE IN RESOLVING THE CRISIS
a. The Congressman’s Post-Crisis Relationship with
Roosevelt
Whitehurst asserted that “F.D.R. never spoke to him again,”247
and legions of commentators and historians have asserted that
Sumners had departed the Roosevelt team. But those views are
incorrect. The President was peeved that his plan failed, and he
undoubtedly recognized Sumners’s significant responsibility. But
Roosevelt had been miffed at the Congressman previously, without
permanent alienation.248 In the immediate aftermath of the crisis,
Roosevelt did take a small jab at Sumners. On September 21st,
Congressman W.D. MacFarlane of Graham, Texas, sent FDR a
clipping from the Fort Worth Star-Telegram reporting a speech
Sumners made to the Dallas Bar Association on September 11th
and characterizing it as expressive of the views “held by a large
majority of the Texas Delegation and many other Delegations in the
South as well as the North, all of whom call themselves
democrats.”249 The newspaper reported that Sumners had stated
that Congress “abdicated its power to follow the leader,” implying
that Roosevelt was acting like a dictator.250
With MacFarlane’s missive in hand, Roosevelt drafted a letter
dated September 21st for signature by his assistant W.H. McIntyre.
Addressing the Congressman as “a dear friend of mine,” the letter
inquired about “the enclosed clipping.”251 FDR’s covering memo to
McIntyre directed: “Check and be sure you get an answer from
Hatton. If you don’t get an answer with a week or 10 days, check
again.”252 Two weeks later Sumners replied to McIntyre that he had
spoken to the bar group extemporaneously but recalled “the drift”
of his speech as distinguishing “between our way of dealing with a
247. Whitehurst, Sumners, supra note 21, at 7.
248. When in FDR’s first term Sumners proved unreceptive to a number of
criminal-law and law-enforcement bills FDR and Cummings wanted, the
following telephone exchange occurred, according a 1952 oral history interview
of the Congressman:
Roosevelt — “Hatton, when are you going to report those bills out of your
committee?” Sumners — “Mr. President, I don't believe that they ought
to be reported out.” Roosevelt — “How would you like to have your
committee taken away from you?” Sumners — “Who in hell is going to do
it?” (Sound of phone banging on the receiver.)
Patenaude, Garner, Sumners, and Connally, supra note 131, at 39 n.13
249. W.H. MacFarlane to FDR, Sept. 21, 1937, FDR Library.
250. Assails Nation's “Hero Worshiping”, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM,
Sept. 12, 1937, at 4.
251. FDR memo to W.H. McIntyre, Sept. 17, 1937, and McIntyre to Sumners,
Sept. 21, 1937, FDR Library.
252. FDR to McIntyre, Sept. 17, 1937.
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crisis in our country and the method pursued in Germany and
Italy.”253 He then turned the tables to chide the President for “our
present situation” in which “some people are so intense with regard
to this court issue” that “it is almost impossible” to discuss
fundamental public problems.254
But Sumners confirmed his loyalty:
I want to be as useful as I can. You call on me just as you always have
done. I feel just as I always did, but I would be willing to go to night
school for a whole year to learn the barbers’ trade if I could get the
fellow just one time in my chair who started things.255

His allusion after the conjunction “but” in the last-quoted sentence
portrays himself as a “barber” so devoted to the President that he
would put his razor to the throat of “the fellow . . . who started
things.” In handwriting Sumners added: “I am a better friend to the
Chief than he, whoever he is.”256 By referring “the fellow” and
“whoever he is,” Sumners was not indicating MacFarlane but rather
insinuating the existence of an unknown, backstage manipulator.
From the outset of the crisis, Sumners posited repeatedly that
“someone” had “imposed” on Roosevelt to make the court-packing
proposal.257 The President was not amused, telling McIntyre that
“[Sumners’s letter] is very interesting and we can now file it with
the reservation that he has not answered in any way.”258 But his
pique did not damage the relationship.
When Love and another candidate sought FDR’s endorsement
in 1938,259 Roosevelt refused, and he appointed Sumners to an
important committee to study antitrust law, an assignment that
Sumners touted in his reelection campaign.260 Sumners was easily
re-elected for the 13th time in November of 1938. The President
continued to need Sumners, and vice versa, throughout the second
term, and they worked together in 1938 to accomplish more
legislatively.
Sumners continued to be a classic Southern Democratic
representative in Congress, freely expressing racial antipathy and
alert to maintain white supremacy, but Sumners’s role in the 1937
court-packing crisis is an exception to the Katznelson corollary
253. HWS to W.H. McIntyre, Oct. 4, 1937, FDR Library.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Beginning in March, in correspondence with certain constituents, then
again in his July 13th speech in the House, and last in in the response letter he
would soon write to Love — Love’s letter to Sumners is dated October 6th, two
days after Sumners’s reply here to FDR — he had so asserted.
258. “TOI” to W.H. McIntyre, Oct. 11, 1937, FDR Library.
259. Love to FDR, June 25, 1938, FDR Library.
260. Relations with F.D.R. Cordial, Says Sumners, DALL. MORNING NEWS,
July 17, 1938, at 1, 7.
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about the position Southern Democratic members of Congress took
against the packing plan during those months. For the other
Southern congressmen, the optimal outcome would have been a
simple, up-and-down defeat of the President’s plan with the result
being Van Devanter’s remaining on the bench for the remainder of
his life, which was four years. If Sumners had been of that mind, he
would have straightforwardly opposed the plan, which he was in a
strong position to do as Judiciary Committee chair. He maneuvered
for the President’s bill to be filed in the Senate, not in the House of
Representatives, and he could have then sat on his hands or spoken
publicly and early against the plan. But he did not.
Instead Sumners pressed his Retirement Bill to quick
enactment, only twenty-four days after the announcement of the
packing plan. The Retirement Act guaranteed the sitting justices, if
and when they retired, undiminished lifetime salaries and
authorized them to continue in the adjudication of cases in the lower
federal courts, if they desired — Van Devanter was the first to
choose to do so.261 In addition to Van Devanter, others departed the
bench relatively soon: George Sutherland took advantage of the
Retirement Act on January 17, 1938; Benjamin Cardozo died on
July 9, 1938; and Louis Brandeis resigned and Pierce Butler died
during the course of 1939.262 Thus, within two and a half years,
Roosevelt had five vacancies to fill, absolutely guaranteeing the
survival of New Deal legislation and enabling FDR to shape the
Court for a long time. (See Table I.) Over his full tenure, Roosevelt
appointed eight justices;263 and from Parrish onward, the Supreme
Court overruled all challenges to all other New Deal legislation.264

261. Van Devanter presided over a “difficult criminal case” and other
matters in the Southern District of New York in the second half of 1937. More
recently, Justice Tom Clark sat many times in the lower courts for ten years
after his 1967 retirement, and until recent years the retired Justice O’Connor
joined panels deciding scores of cases in the Courts of Appeal in all but one
federal circuit. In the decades since, only five justices have resigned, most
recently Abe Fortas in 1969, but 26 have retired with the benefits of the
Retirement Act. See ARTEMUS WARD, DECIDING TO LEAVE: THE POLITICS OF
RETIREMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2003); Stephen L.
Wasby, Retired Supreme Court Justices in the Courts of Appeals, 39 J. SUP. CT.
Hist. 146, 149 (2014); E. Jon A. Gryskiewicz, The Semi-Retirement of Senior
Supreme Court Justices: Examining their Service on the Courts of Appeals, 11
SETON HALL CIR. REV. 285 (2015); Minor Myers, III, The Judicial Service of
Retired U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 32 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 46 (2007). The
Retirement Act is of course available to today’s sitting justices.
262. See Table 1, infra.
263. Ross, Hughes Court, supra note 113, at 238-39 (FDR was enabled “to
‘pack’ the Court seriatim without any legislated increase in the number of
justices”).
264. Today the Retirement Act is 28 U.S.C. § 371.
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Table 1. Supreme Court Justices During Roosevelt’s
Presidency265
Justice
Willis Van
Devanter
(4/17/18592/8/1941)
George
Sutherland
(3/25/18627/18/1942)
Benjamin
Cardoza
(5/24/18707/9/1938)
Louis
Brandeis
(11/13/185610/5/1941)
Pierce
Butler
(3/17/186611/16/1939)
James
McReynolds
(2/3/18628/24/1946)
Owen
Roberts
(5/2/18755/17/1955)
Charles
Hughes
(4/11/18628/27/1948)
Harlan
Stone
(10/11/18724/22/1946)

Age on
Black
Monday
(5/27/1
935)

Supreme
Court
Appointment

76

12/16/1910

6/2/1937

73

9/5/1922

1/17/1938

65

3/2/1932

70

6/1/1916

69

12/21/1922

73

8/29/1914

1/31/1941

James
Byrne

60

5/20/1930

7/31/1945

Harold
Burton

73

2/13/1930

6/30/1941

Harlan
Stone

62

2/5/1925
&7/3/1941

Exit
by
Death

Exit by
Retirement

7/9/19
38

Replaced by

Hugo Black

Stanley
Reed

Felix
Frankfurter

William
Douglas
11/16/
1939

4/21/1
946

Frank
Murphy

Fred Vinson

The Retirement Act was an efficient way to end the packing
crisis; once Van Devanter took advantage of it, the crisis was over
as a practical matter. The result was his replacement with Hugo
Black, a Senator quite loyal to the President and, although
discovered to have been a KKK member in the 1920s, one of the
most liberal and consequential Supreme Court justices ever.266 If

265. Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Article III Federal
Judges, 1789-Present, www.fjc.gov/history/judges [perma.cc/ET8H-UAUL].
266. OXFORD COMPANION, Black, Hugo Lafayette, supra note 93, at 72-75.
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simply ending the court-packing crisis had been Sumners’s only
objective, the enactment of the Retirement Act and the replacement
of Van Devanter would have been out of kilter with, as Katznelson
found it, the desire of Southern congressional Democrats. Moreover,
in the scholarly literature, the Retirement Act is universally saluted
as a permanent improvement to the functioning of the Supreme
Court and the judicial branch of federal government.
Additionally, Sumners sponsored the Intervention Bill and
worked through the legislative process to its enactment on August
24th, at the end of the crisis period. This act too is unanimously
regarded by the few legal scholars who have noticed and commented
on it as a permanent structural improvement to the federal judicial
system.267 The act did not end the packing crisis — the crisis was
already over by the time the Senate Judiciary Committee took up
and, with McCarran’s amendment, passed Sumners’s House Bill
2260 — but it operated to prevent a recurrence of the New Deal’s
litigation problem that had impelled the President to propose his
plan. The Intervention Act actually enhanced federal power. Since
then, the attorneys general have intervened, or have had
opportunity to do so, in all cases in federal courts presenting
dispositive issues of constitutionality of federal statutes.268
Similarly, three-judge panels have consistently been required for
injunctions in cases presenting such issues.269 The act inhibited a
new wave of invalidations and made it more difficult for future
dissidents to obtain reversal of any existing or further New Deal
programs, or the programs of any succeeding president of any
party.270
Sumners had long been conversant with and participated to an
extent in some of the currents of realism and reform running
through the leading law schools271 and legal think tanks such as the

267. Revision of Procedure in Constitutional Litigation: The Act of 1937, 38
COLUM. L. REV. 153 (1938) (“Act seeks to ensure an adequate defense of federal
legislation’); Caleb Nelson, Intervention, 106 VA. L. REV. 271, 345 n. 246 (2020)
(“To ensure that the public was adequately represented in these cases”).
268. In two of the next three cases, although notified, the Attorney General
declined to intervene. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,
304 U.S. 92, 100-01 (1938) (intervened); Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co.,
304 U.S. 502, 504 (1938) (declined); Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304
U.S. 518 (1938) (declined). One notable failure to notify and failure to intervene
was 1938’s Erie decision, in which Justices Butler and McReynolds in dissent
characterized the majority’s disapproval of the Swift v. Tyson doctrine as a
constitutionality decision about which notice and opportunity to intervene
should have been given to the Justice Department. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 88-89 (1938).
269. 28 U.S.C. § 2284; Currie, Three-Judge District Court, supra note 227.
270. Today, the intervention provision of the Intervention Act is found at 28
U.S.C. § 2403 with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.1 implementing it, and the three-judge
injunctive provision is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2284.
271. His correspondence includes letters with contemporary legal lights
such as Roscoe Pound, Dean of Harvard Law School. See, e.g., HWS to Roscoe
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American Law Institute272 and the American Judicature Society;
and during the thirties he was closely associated with others who,
for different reasons, were pressing for reforms of the legal system
such as the leadership of the American Bar Association.273 For
example, during 1934 he facilitated the enactment of the Rules
Enabling Act, considered today a landmark of federal legal-process
reform, and he almost continuously sought to modernize federal
criminal law. Sumners was a racist and he was also a Depressionera legal reformer at the federal level.
In 1937, Sumners may well have been personally conflicted. On
one hand, he desired to protect white supremacy for the long run
and to prevent or avoid the increase of federal power over state
power that might be applied to overcome the South’s system of
racial segregation and oppression — how else can anyone read his
speech of April 17th on the floor of the House and his repeated
legislative efforts to derail anti-lynching bills, then and before and
after 1937? Yet, on the other hand, he was deeply concerned about
the ideal functioning of the federal legal system, specifically the
constitutional separation of powers, including the concept of judicial
independence and the proper and efficient operations of federal
courts274 and the federal legal system. Additionally, he was also
concerned about the survival of the New Deal initiatives, such as
economic recovery programs that benefitted his constituents in his

Pound, May 19, 1930, Sumners Papers (stating “I was much impressed by your
characterization of current developments,” and also enclosing for Pound a copy
of one of HWS’s speeches).
272. Sumners spoke to meeting of the American Law Institute in 1940, and
he filed in the House and carried the “Bill to Provide a Correctional System for
Adult and Youth Offenders Convicted in the Courts of the United States” on
behalf of the ALI a few years later. J. Harris Gardner, Review of SHELDON AND
ELEANOR GLUECK, CRIMINAL CAREERS IN RETROSPECT, 22 TEX. L. REV. 514,
516 (1944).
273. The ABA had “the reputation . . . as a relentless source of opposition to
the New Deal,” RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY : ELITE
LAWYERS IN THE NEW DEAL at 37 (1995), but it also worked for modernization
of the law and legal procedure. Sumners had a strong relationship with both the
ABA, see Second Session of Assembly Hears Comprehensive Plan for Judicial
Reform Presented by Section on Judicial Administration - Work of American
Law Institute, 24 A.B.A. J. 691, 740 (per its president, Arthur T. Vanderbilt, “I
have never known any public official who has cooperated more with the officers
of the American Bar Association than has Judge Sumners.”), and the Texas Bar
Association and the Dallas Bar Association, all of whom applauded him for his
legislative work to resolve the court-packing crisis.
274. In 1939, Sumners delivered one of the keynote addresses at the
Supreme Court on the occasion of its 150 anniversary, and his topic was “judicial
independence.” Address of Hon. Hatton W. Sumners, Representative from Texas,
PROCEEDINGS AT THE CEREMONIES IN COMMEMORATION OF THE ONE HUNDRED
AND FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES (Feb. 1, 1940).
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Fifth Congressional District.275 In these latter regards, one of the
few scholars to have focused on Sumners put it very simply:
“Throughout his congressional career, Sumners willingly worked
within the system.”276 The Katnelson thesis provides an explanation
of how Sumners resolved or accommodated his internal tension.
Sumners was a participant in the compact or deal Katznelson found
to have existed between the Southern congressmen and Roosevelt.
Specifically, Sumners resolved any internal conflict, and both
helped assure the survival of the New Deal and also improved the
federal legal system through his two bills that bookended the courtpacking crisis.

b. A Parsing of Sumners’s “Cash In” Remark
Finally, the story of Sumners’s bookend statutes provides
occasion for parsing his famous “cash in” catchphrase of February
5th. Historian Lionel Patenaude, who interviewed Sumners in
1952, paraphrased what he understood the Congressman to have
told him about those two words: “In Sumner's mind, ‘cash in’ meant
what he said—willingness to sacrifice his political future for
principle. In other words, he could not support the administration
on this issue and had to risk the consequences.”277 But Glock reads
the phrase differently: “He wanted to ‘cash in’ by using the situation
to his and his party’s benefit in pushing his retirement bill.”278 Glock
has the better view.
Sumners should be believed that his February 5th utterance
had not contained the additional words “my chips” because in his
October 23rd reply to Love he specified the remark as “cash in” and
then twice repeated it as that two-word phrase.279 Sumners thereby
indicated that “cash in” meant something different from “cash in my
chips.” His letter to Love mentioned that he meant the term “as we
know that phrase in the Southwest.”280 Two Western slang
dictionaries define the two-word phrase “cash in” as “[t]o pass from
this mortal life” or “to die.”281 A number of general slang dictionaries
demonstrate, however, another well-established meaning for “cash
275. De Moss, Dallas, 1929-1933, supra note 70.
276. Monroe, A Day in July, supra note 21 at 32.
277. Patenaude, Garner, Sumners, and Connally, supra note 131, at 38 &
38 n. 12 (citing as the source for the paraphrase “Sumners to L[ionel] V.
P[atenaude], interview, September 25, 1952”).
278. Glock, Unpacking, supra note 18, at 31.
279. Moreover, he used the phrase without “my chips” in several FebruaryApril letters to confidants in Dallas. See, e.g., HWS to W.S. Mosher, Mar. 8,
1937, Sumners Papers [hereinafter HWS to Mosher].
280. HWS to Love, supra note 7.
281. RAMON F. ADAMS, WESTERN WORDS: A DICTIONARY OF THE RANGE,
COW CAMP AND TRAIL, cash in, 29 (1944); RON GALE, “COWBOY JARGON”: A
DICTIONARY OF COWBOY AND WESTERN SLANG: WORDS AND PHRASES at 23
(2010).
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in”: “to make profit or to exploit”282 or simply “to succeed.”283 And a
few dictionaries provide alternative definitions of “cash in” as to
“die” and, on the other hand, to “score,” to “make a profit,” or to
“exploit.”284
It is possible that the Congressman may have been conflating
the “to die” and the “to succeed” senses of the phrase, with the
resulting meaning that he was going to use his position in the fight
over the plan to seek an advantage or to obtain a benefit for “the
President, the party, and the country” but also, as indicated by the
phrase in his reply to Love “not to count the cost to myself” that he
recognized a risk of political injury.285 One of his letters during the
crisis to a constituent that used the phrase “cash in” may be
supportive. To a Dallas businessman with whom he was close, the
Congressman wrote on March 8th: “Insofar as my political fortunes
are concerned, I am perfectly willing to cash in if I can be useful to
my country in this great emergency. That is confidential, because
people would misunderstand it. They would think I am trying to put
myself on parade.”286
282. JONATHON GREEN, CASSELL'S DICTIONARY OF SLANG 248 (1998); SEE
ALSO TOM DALZELL & TERRY VICTOR, EDS., THE NEW PARTRIDGE DICTIONARY
OF SLANG AND UNCONVENTIONAL ENGLISH, cash in 353 (2006) (“to die” or “to

take advantage of something and profit thereby”).
283. ERIC PARTRIDGE, A DICTIONARY OF SLANG AND UNCONVENTIONAL
ENGLISH, cash in, 187 (1984); ERIC PARTRIDGE, A DICTIONARY OF SLANG AND
UNCONVENTIONAL ENGLISH, cash in 131 (1953); see also B.A. PHYTHIAN, A
CONCISE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH SLANG AND COLLOQUIALISMS, cash in 32 (“to
take advantage of opportunity to make money); NTC’S AMERICAN IDIOMS
DICTIONARY, cash in 50 (B.A. Phythian ed., 1987) (“to earn a lot of money at
something; to make a profit at something”).
284. LESTER V. BERREY & MELVIN VAN DEN BARK, THE AMERICAN
THESAURUS OF SLANG 117, 710 (1943) (“cash in” is a synonym for “die” but also
for “score”); JONATHON GREEN, GREEN’S DICTIONARY OF SLANG, cash in 1001
(2010) (“to die” or alternatively “to make a profit, to exploit”).
285. Some sources assert that Sumners would have been a candidate for
appointment to the Supreme Court but for the court-packing crisis. See, e.g.,
CONRAD BLACK, FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT: CHAMPION OF FREEDOM 409
(2012) (“The list of those the President was expected to name to the Supreme
Court was headed by Felix Frankfurter, James M. Landis, Lloyd Garrison,
Senator Robert Wagner, and Hatton Sumners.” (emphasis added)); Hatton W.
Sumners Dies; Fought FDR, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Apr. 20, 1962, at 1 (“In
1937, at the height of his career Mr. Summers was openly regarded as the
logical choice for the next vacancy on the Supreme Court. But destiny
intervened.”).
286. HWS to Mosher, supra note 279 (emphasis added); see also HWS to P.D.
Jackson, Mar. 4, 1937 (“when it is finished I hope I will have been useful in the
situation”); HWS to D.A. Frank, Mar. 8, 1937 (“I have not the slightest concern
as to what happens to me to do not only what I fee to be my duty, but possibly
my opportunity to be useful”); HWS to Eric C. Schroeder, Mar. 15, 1937 (“My
suggestion is that you wait until whole thing is over with and then make up
your mind about my attitude.”); HWS to E.P. Simmons, Mar. 20, 1937 (“I am
trying to render [a service]”); HWS to Harry D. Scott, Mar. 30, 1937 (“no hope
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The final sentence in Sumners’s reply to Love in which the
Congressman predicted that he was going to be “seen in the future
as having rendered a valuable service” to everyone, “the President,
the party and the country”287 indicates that Sumners was not using
the “cash in” phrase in the sense of a metaphorical death or of a
gambler “cashing in” chips for money and simply walking away.
Rather Sumners acknowledged that on February 5th, he knew he
was striding directly into the middle of, not away from, the volatile
situation the President created. The thrust of his response letter to
Love was to signify that he hoped and even expected to succeed, and,
believing his efforts would yield a positive result, that he might
benefit personally from having caused the resolution of the crisis.
The terminal reference at the end of that final sentence of his
letter to “the other legislation which I sponsored” confirms this
interpretation because Sumners not only hastened and facilitated
the President’s addition of new, congenial justices for the Supreme
Court by his Retirement Act but also sponsored the Intervention Act
to reduce the risk and enable better control for Roosevelt in the
event of new constitutional challenges to the New Deal. These are
significant changes in the functioning of law, statutory law
applicable to the relationship of the president and the Supreme
Court, that well served Roosevelt and that benefit future chief
executives who propose any innovative or wide-ranging program of
legislation to effect great change in society or the economy. So
Sumners really did “cash in” by accomplishing the President’s goal
— not by the court-packing plan but rather by his two statutory
bookends to the crisis that the plan created.

of reward or fear of punishment is going to turn me aside from what I feel is my
duty”); all in Sumners Papers.
287. HWS to Love, supra note 7.

